We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics
between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional
change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional
units, understood as generic governed social structures. We show how endogenized trust
and exogenously given leader authority influences institutional change, i.e., diversity in
institutional life-cycles. It turns out that these governed institutions (de)structure in cyclical
patterns dependent on the overall evolution of trust in the artificial society, while at the same
time, influencing this evolution by supporting social learning. Simulation results indicate
three scenarios of institutional life-cycles. Institutions may, (1) build up very fast and
freeze the artificial society in a stable but fearful pattern (ordered system); (2) exist only for
a short time, leading to a very trusty society (highly fluctuating system); and (3) structure
in cyclical patterns over time and support social learning due to cumulative causation of
societal trust (complex system).
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:5883 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Wäckerle, Manuel, Rengs, Bernhard, Radax, Wolfgang |
| Publisher | MDPI |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, PeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Austria |
| Relation | http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g5030160, http://www.mdpi.com/journal/games, http://www.mdpi.com/, http://epub.wu.ac.at/5883/ |
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