Software development projects typically involve repeated interactions among several groups of people. This setting seems well suited for an analysis by means of the standard-model of the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Computer simulations of a population of stochastic reactive strategies show that the existence of intergroup discrimination can be modeled endogeneously as a result of noise due to misperception of the opponent's move. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers on Information Systems, Information Business and Operations
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:epub-wu-01_779 |
| Date | January 2004 |
| Creators | Eckert, Daniel, Janko, Wolfgang, Mitlöhner, Johann |
| Publisher | Institut für Informationsverarbeitung und Informationswirtschaft, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Paper, NonPeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | http://epub.wu.ac.at/1672/ |
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