Tax aggressiveness generates significant cash savings and information asymmetry. Combining these two consequences of tax aggressiveness, I suggest that tax aggressiveness is associated with higher agency costs of free cash flows that affect investment decisions. Using the conditional investment efficiency model, I find evidence that tax aggressiveness is associated with more investments in firms with high access to investable funds, thus suggesting tax aggressiveness is associated with overinvestment. I also provide evidence that stronger tax monitoring and a change in tax disclosures mitigate the relation between tax aggressiveness and overinvestment. Lastly, I find that the overinvestment is associated with lower future abnormal returns. Thus, my results suggest that poor managerial investment decision making is an unintended consequence to tax aggressiveness. Additionally, I further the need for shareholders and board of directors to exert influence to avoid compensating managers for aggressive tax strategies.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/612100 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Goldman, Nathan Chad, Goldman, Nathan Chad |
| Contributors | Dhaliwal, Dan S., Drake, Katharine D., Sunder, Jayanthi, Dhaliwal, Dan S. |
| Publisher | The University of Arizona. |
| Source Sets | University of Arizona |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text, Electronic Dissertation |
| Rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. |
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