abstract: One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organizations. I focus on two organizations: corporate board and political parties. I find that this information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the members who shared information. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom in both corporate finance and political party literature. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Economics 2014
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:25180 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Contributors | Wu, Zhenhua (Author), Friedenberg, Amanda (Advisor), Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member), Chade, Hector (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Source Sets | Arizona State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Dissertation |
| Format | 167 pages |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/, All Rights Reserved |
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