This study offers a reconstructive account of the concept of pure synthesis as it occurs in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. In order to make sense of a pure sensible synthesis, it will be necessary to provide a detailed account of the transcendental processes that are derived from the subjective sources of the mind prior to any working account of the logical functions ofjudgment. Stated succinct.~y, our approach will deal with the concept of synthesis from a transcendental 'psycholo'gical perspective. I will argue that a metalevel of transcendental psychology can be uncovered that releases certain functions for concepts of comparison that is different to how Kant stipulates their use in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection section of the Critique. To supplement an account of pure sensible synthesis, I will argue that what I call a 'pure rule of apprehension' or a 'pure rule of synthesis' is constructed out of concepts of comparison and functions as a pure sensible schema. The 'pure rule of apprehension' is modelled on the fundamental action of Kant's Pure Synthesis of Apprehension as it appears in the A Version of the Transcendental Deduction. The rule of synthesis acts as an original schema that can be applied directly to the pl!re manifolds oftime and space prior to objects. It will be argued that the concept of pure sensible synthesis and its accompanying pure sensible schema carry out an ontological function as transcendental elements prior to the reflections carried out by the categories, and prior to the comparisons of empirical representations that first generate concepts of objects. The reconstruction of synthesis and a corresponding schema constitutes the first two main stages of the thesis in Chapters One and Two. This part of the thesis will relate to the area of Kant scholarship that pays particular attention to the subjective sources of the mind, especially the role of the transcendental synthesis of imagination and the determination of intuitions in the Critique. I will subject certain authors to a series of close readings in order to develop the concepts of pure sensible synthesis and a pure sensible schema. In the third and fourth stages of the thesis will move away from the concepts of synthesis and schematism. In Chapter Three I will develop a line of argument that sheds new light on the concept of an object prior to synthesis by examining Kant's Refutation ofIdealism. I will argue that it is possible to conceive of a pure transcendental 'place' or 'location' of a pure object of permanence not mentioned by Kant, by making use of concepts of comparison functioning as pure orientational concepts. In the Fourth Chapter I will round the study off by expounding the central conceptual processes that are at work in the project as a whole, which differ significantly from the way' that Kant employs I' concepts in the first Critique. I will argue that concepts of comparison exhibit functions that are not confined to discursive procedures involved in generating concepts of objects. This completes the thesis. The project starts by examining the concept of synthesis, before moving on to the related theme of schematism. I then deal with the concept of an object, finishing with an examination of the nature of conceptualitx that unifies the project as a whole.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:486416 |
| Date | January 2007 |
| Creators | Hems, Nigel Colin |
| Publisher | Manchester Metropolitan University |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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