Near-field contact less payments using contactless cards or NFC devices are quickly becoming a quicker and more convenient alternative to conventional means of carrying out small value purchases. Along with their increased popularity, there are rising concerns regarding their security. Existing research has shown that certain attacks can be used successfully against contact less technology, but it is unclear how such attacks can be translated into a feasible and clear threat to a user's privacy and financial security. Therefore there is a need for an evaluation to determine whether physical layer based attacks could be used by attackers to cause financial or anonymity loss to an individual. This dissertation presents the design and implementation of an inconspicuous, easily concealable and portable system that could be used to reliably eavesdrop contactless transactions. This includes guidelines on the effective and efficient design of eavesdropping antennas, including the use of large metallic structures already within the vicinity of such an attack, along with the assembly of a communications receiver consisting of readily available electronics with a moderate cost.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:616478 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Diakos, Thomas P. |
| Publisher | University of Surrey |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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