The research examines the effectiveness of governance systems in venture capital (VC)-backed technology-based new ventures that are not yet at the initial public offering stage of their life cycle. Venture capital syndicated investments introduce two types of agency issues: principal-agent between the founders and the venture capitalists, and principal-principal that is between the venture capitalists involved in the technology-based new firms. The research argues that to conduct monitoring to mitigate the additional agency risk between the venture capitalists, as well as with the founder, the board would strive to be more independent, and they could only be effective when they possessed the capabilities and resources to aid in the development of the new venture. The research considers the influence of foreign venture capitalists involved in the syndication, as they put further strain on the governance system, calling for boards to be even more independent and particularly focus on replacing the Founder-CEO with a Professional-CEO. The theoretical framework advances the understanding that boards monitor and provide resources to their new ventures to develop and be competitive. The study empirically tests an integrated model combining both the agency and resource-based views to analyze the governance mechanisms.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:638051 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Shukla, Dhirendra |
| Publisher | King's College London (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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