The notion that we are essentially conscious beings has a good deal of intuitive appeal, but also gives rise to a number of philosophical problems. As a result of its appeal, and in conjunction with a growing dissatisfaction with reductive accounts of consciousness, a number of experiential accounts of personal identity have been introduced into the relatively recent literature. These accounts offer various analyses of the relationship between consciousness and selfhood in an attempt to overcome the problems faced by adopting such a position. I argue that a correct appreciation of the nature of inner awareness, and experience more generally, entails that the experiential approach is indeed justifiable. Specifically, I argue that the relationship between an experience and its subject necessitates the view that selves are constituted by episodes of consciousness. I then evaluate a number of theories of temporal consciousness and argue that the most promising kind of account has implications concerning our persistence conditions. Subsequently, I argue for a radical account of our nature by defending the resulting ontological claim: selves are streams of consciousness.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:706633 |
| Date | January 2015 |
| Creators | Winfield, Tom |
| Publisher | University of Liverpool |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/2049720/ |
Page generated in 0.0024 seconds