This dissertation presents and responds to the following problem. For Kant a field
of enquiry can be a science only if it is systematic. Most sciences achieve systematicity
through having a unified content and method. Physics, for example, has a unified content,
as it is the science of matter in motion, and a unified method because all claims in physics
must be verified through empirical testing. In order for metaphysics to be a science it also
must be systematic. However, metaphysics cannot have a unified content or method
because metaphysicians lack a positive conception of what its content and method are.
On Kant's account, metaphysicians can say with certainty what metaphysics does not
study and what methods it cannot use, but never how it should proceed. Without unified
content and method systematicity can only be guaranteed by some either means, namely,
completeness. Without completeness metaphysics cannot have systematicity and every
science must be systematic. Completeness can only be achieved if we severely limit the
scope of metaphysics so that it contains only the conditions for the possibility of
experience. This dissertation defends the claims made about the centrality of completeness in
understanding Kant's conception of metaphysics as a science in two ways. First, the first two chapters point to a substantial body of textual evidence that supports the idea that
Kant was directly concerned about the notion of completeness and links it to his
conception of metaphysics as a science. Chapters 3 and 4 consider some possible
objections to thinking that metaphysics as a science can be complete, giving special
consideration to Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Chapter 5 explains why, if this
position is as clear as this dissertation has argued, previous scholars have failed to
acknowledge it. Giving a full answer to this question requires considering the general
neglect of the "Doctrine of Method" section of Kant's primary theoretical text, The
Critique of Pure Reason. The Doctrine of Method contains many of the passages which
most directly support my thesis. Chapter 6 explains why scholars have ignored this
important passage and argues that they should not continue to do so.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bu.edu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/15266 |
| Date | 12 March 2016 |
| Creators | Robinson, Elizabeth Ann |
| Source Sets | Boston University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis/Dissertation |
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