Classical utilitarianism faces significant problems: it ignores moral rights; it cannot
take account of all free rational agents; and its focus on happiness means that it
dismisses the other things that people value for their own sake. These problems lead
to conflicts with autonomy, personal integrity and inconsistencies with the way in
which utilitarianism justifies the value of happiness. This thesis seeks to solve these
problems by introducing the protection of freedom as a new measure of utility.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:canterbury.ac.nz/oai:ir.canterbury.ac.nz:10092/9033 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | McKay, Daniel Christopher |
| Publisher | University of Canterbury. Philosophy |
| Source Sets | University of Canterbury |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic thesis or dissertation, Text |
| Rights | Copyright Daniel Christopher McKay, http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/thesis/etheses_copyright.shtml |
| Relation | NZCU |
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