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Genius and genus: how to name things with metaphors = 天才物類 : 論以喻名事. / 天才物類: 論以喻名事 / Genius and genus: how to name things with metaphors = Tian cai wu lei : lun yi yu ming shi. / Tian cai wu lei: lun yi yu ming shi

本研究旨在以模態語義論之角度分析隱喻的語言特性,並探討其在語言演化中的作用。作者認為,隱喻言語的發生通常預含有命名行為,即以現有之舊詞指命新的事物範疇,且這類以喻名事乃是自然類詞彙的基本命名方式。為探討自然類詞彙的語義特性,本研究首先藉回顧Kripke 及Putnam 有關經典論述,論述自然類詞彙的外延在其命名之初具有不可確定性,因而其本身就便於以譬喻的方式改變外延。其次作者批評兩家以語用角度研究隱喻的經典理論即Grice 即Davidson,指出其理論未能解決隱喻命題的真值問題。關於認知角度方面的理論,本研究亦批評Black 及Lakoff 等人的成果。作者論述,這類理論誇大隱喻的超語言功能,混淆了語義與一般認知的界限。最後,作者以模態語義理論中的二維語義框架界定隱喻的語義特性。 / This study approaches metaphor from the perspective of modal semantics, and aims at defending, clarifying, and constraining an intuitive idea of this linguistic phenomenon based on its instrumental function in language evolution. The central claim is that a metaphorical utterance characteristically presumes a naming ceremony under a conventional word for a new category. To understand the potential of metaphorical re-dubbing of conventional terms, I will firstly appeal to Kripke’s classic modal argument, and examine the semantic plasticity of natural kind terms, which are typically used as vehicles for metaphorical expressions. The work will proceed to defend the naming function of metaphor by criticizing the classic stance against semantic understanding of metaphor, namely the Pragmatist approach. Restricting the possibility of semantic discussion only to conventionalized vocabulary, the Pragmatists treat the extra message in metaphor either as a sort of conversational implicature (Grice) or speaker meaning (Searle), which is still expressible in conventional vocabulary, or as some kind of extra-linguistic force (Davidson). I will argue that the treatment of Grice and Searle fails to appreciate the categorical incompatibility lying behind metaphors, and thus fails to see that the meaning of metaphorical expressions is irreducible to conventional vocabulary. Moreover, all of the Pragmatists fail also to account for an apparent semantic behavior of metaphors, namely, their possible truth assumed by participants in conversations. I will then try to constrain the proper semantic understanding of metaphor by distinguishing it from the Cognitivist view represented by Black and Lakoff, which identifies the meaning of metaphors with the content resulted from various sorts of analogical cognition. I will argue that, theoretically speaking, analogical cognition is neither necessary nor sufficient in order for a metaphorical expression to be uttered. The final portion of this work will be devoted to developing a two-dimensional framework to capture the modal relation between the meanings of an expression token under metaphorical and conventional interpretations, respectively. In doing so, this work will also criticize a current view represented by Stern, which, by treating metaphors as a special sort of indexical expressions, also fails to explain the evolutional function of metaphor. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Deng, Yangzhou. / Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-98). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Deng, Yangzhou.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_1077664
Date January 2014
ContributorsDeng, Yangzhou (author.), Guan, Ziyin (thesis advisor.), Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy, (degree granting institution.)
Source SetsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
LanguageEnglish, Chinese
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, bibliography, text
Formatelectronic resource, electronic resource, remote, 1 online resource (98 leaves), computer, online resource
RightsUse of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

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