Return to search

The phenomenal concept strategy.

Liu, Pengbo. / "September 2010." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 94-96). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Physicalism and its Discontents --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Physicalism --- p.2 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- "Two Problems in Characterizing ""Physicalism""" --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- The Explanatory Gap --- p.6 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- The First Manifestation of the Explanatory Gap: Mary's New Knowledge --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- The Epistemic (Explanatory) Gap and the Ontological Gap --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.4 --- Levine on the Explanatory Gap --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS): The Basics --- p.16 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Two Accounts of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.18 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Quotational Account of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.18 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- The Quotation Analogy --- p.18 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- The Fundamental Use and Derived Use --- p.20 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Why Mental Quotation? --- p.22 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Problems of the Quotational Account --- p.25 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Recognitional/Demonstrative Account of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Type Demonstratives and Token Demonstratives --- p.31 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- "Recognition, Memory, and Imagination" --- p.37 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- The Possession Condition of Recognitional Concepts --- p.40 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- PRC and PC --- p.41 / Chapter 2.2.6 --- Compare the Quotational Account and the Loarian Recognitional Account --- p.45 / Chapter 2.2.7 --- Reply to Balog's Complaint --- p.47 / Chapter 2.3 --- Objections and Replies --- p.49 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Chalmers' Objection --- p.49 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Raffman's Objection: --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Examined --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy: A Brief Review --- p.55 / Chapter 3.2 --- Stoljar's Objections --- p.57 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Experience Thesis and the A priori/ A priori Synthesizable --- p.58 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- The Immediacy Thesis and Phenomenal Acquaintance --- p.60 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Conceptual Difference and Conceptual Gap --- p.66 / Chapter 3.2.5 --- Conclusion --- p.72 / Chapter 3.3 --- Chalmers' Objection to PCS --- p.72 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Chalmers' Master Argument --- p.73 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Balog's Reply --- p.78 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- A Worry about Balog's Reply --- p.82 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Epistemic Situation and the Explanatory Gap --- p.84 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- An Alternative Reply: Some Speculations --- p.87 / Chapter 3.3.6 --- Conclusion --- p.92 / Bibliography --- p.94

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_327162
Date January 2010
ContributorsLiu, Pengbo., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy.
Source SetsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
LanguageEnglish, Chinese
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, bibliography
Formatprint, iv, 96 p. ; 30 cm.
RightsUse of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Page generated in 0.0799 seconds