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Obfuscation of Rent Extraction Behavior: Evidence from Investment Inefficiency

I investigate the association between rent extraction and qualitative/quantitative characteristics of 10-K filings (i.e. readability, financial statement comparability and earnings transparency), subject to existing monitoring constraints. This study focuses on one type of such rent extraction – investment inefficiency (i.e. overinvestment or underinvestment), as extant research provides evidence that it provides personal benefits to managers, often at the expense of shareholders. Managers have incentives to invest inefficiently but such behavior may be undesirable and result in negative consequences to the manager, such as turnover. Therefore, I expect that managers are likely to obfuscate information in order to make it difficult for investors to detect investment inefficiency, although monitoring over financial reporting may limit their ability to do so. I test whether monitoring over financial reporting reduces information obfuscation. Last, I study the joint effects of investment inefficiency and information obfuscation on CEO turnover and compensation.
I expect that investment inefficiency is positively associated with information obfuscation but this relation is weaker for firms with effective monitoring mechanisms over financial reporting. Further, I examine how these factors affect CEO disciplining. Managers get disciplined for inefficient investment decisions. Obfuscating information makes it difficult for investors to evaluate managers’ investment decisions. Therefore, I examine whether information obfuscation prevents managers from being disciplined as a result of inefficient investment behavior.
I find that investment inefficiency is positively associated with information obfuscation. Managers are more likely to obfuscate information for overinvestment type of inefficiency as opposed to underinvestment. Further, the results suggest that, while internal monitoring does not reduce information obfuscation, external monitoring constrains information obfuscation. I find that external monitoring (i.e. auditors) provide more stringent monitoring by reducing information obfuscation. I do not find support for my last prediction that information obfuscation prevents disciplining of CEOs. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection
ContributorsMammadov, Babak (author), Thevenot, Maya (Thesis advisor), Florida Atlantic University (Degree grantor), College of Business, School of Accounting
PublisherFlorida Atlantic University
Source SetsFlorida Atlantic University
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation, Text
Format125 p., application/pdf
RightsCopyright © is held by the author, with permission granted to Florida Atlantic University to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.,

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