<p> In this thesis I attempt to clarify the nature and limits of the Socratic elenchus in order to determine whether or not it is capable of justifying moral knowledge as Socrates understood it. To this end, I first compare and contrast the elenchus with previous philosophical methods. I then argue that Socrates conceived of moral knowledge as expert knowledge of virtue by way of definition. Finally, I analyze the elenchus itself, and I argue: (i) that it is, in principle, capable of adequately justifying positive convictions about virtue, but only in those cases where Socrates makes no use of premises which are either logically unsecured with.in the demonstration or which lack justification from external, nonelenctic sources (ad hoc premises) ; and (ii) that since Socrates often proclaims elenctic success despite using ad hoc premises, I conclude that his lack of epistemological and logical interest led him to habitually overestimate the results of his arguments.</p> / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/15784 |
| Date | 09 1900 |
| Creators | Strong , Anthony Paul |
| Contributors | Panagiotou, S., Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
Page generated in 0.0018 seconds