Is human dignity as critics deride it: a useless concept that is as devoid of philosophical substance as a slogan on a bumper sticker? Or are philosophico-methodological expectations to blame for its critical demise?
The latter possibility—left unexplored until now—raises three related questions. First, is dignity too vague (or metaphorical) to be meaningful? Chapter I provides voluminous evidence to the contrary. Second, is dignity the basis of moral equality? Chapter II examines the unexpected complications of operating on that noble-seeming assumption. Third, is the very idea of human dignity symptomatic of species snobbery? Possibly, but it’s been said that dignitarians—worse than being species snobs—are full-blown human supremacists. Chapter 3 probes that polemical charge and finds it wanting. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / How did the hallmark of humanity’s highest qualities sink to the lows of a (supposedly) empty slogan? Is it because the concept of dignity is so muddled as to be meaningless? Or has it been disparaged as incurably vague for methodological reasons that, though woefully under-researched, might better explain its embattled status? This dissertation addresses—and remedies—the lack of philosophical interest in the latter possibility.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/25207 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Morris, Justin |
| Contributors | Igneski, Violetta, Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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