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Darwin's doubt : implications of the theory of evolution for human knowledge

Thesis (DPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this dissertation I enquire into the status, scope and limits of human knowledge, given the
fact that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are the product of evolution by natural
selection. I argue that the commonsense representations these faculties provide us with yield a
particular, species-specific scope on the world that does not ‘correspond’ in any
straightforward way to the external world. We are, however, not bound by these
commonsense representations. This particular, species-specific view of the world can be
transgressed. Nevertheless, our transgressing representations remain confined to the
conceptual space defined by the combinatorial possibilities of the various representational
tools we possess. Furthermore, the way in which we fit representations to the external world is
by means of our biologically determined epistemic orientation. Based on the fact that we are
endowed with a particular set of perceptual and cognitive resources and are guided by a
particular epistemic orientation, I conclude that we have a particular cognitive relation to the
world. Therefore, an accurate representation for us is a particular fit (our epistemic
orientation) with particular means (our perceptual and cognitive resources). / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis handel oor die aard, omvang en limiete van kennis, gegewe dat ons perseptuele
en kognitiewe vermoëns die resultaat van evolusie deur middel van natuurlike seleksie is.
Eerstens, word daar geargumenteer dat die algemene voorstellings wat hierdie vermoëns aan
ons bied ‘n partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld aan ons gee, wat nie op ‘n
eenvoudige manier korrespondeer aan die werklikheid nie. Ons is egter nie gebonde aan
hierdie voorstellings nie. Hierdie partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld kan
oorskry word. Ons is egter wel beperk tot die konseptuele ruimte wat gedefinieër word deur
die kombinatoriese moontlikhede van die voorstellingsmiddele tot ons beskikking. Verder
word die manier waarop ons hierdie voorstellings aan die wêreld laat pas deur ons biologies
gedetermineerde epistemiese oriëntasie bepaal. Dus, gegewe dat ons ‘n spesifieke stel
perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns het en deur ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe epistemiese
oriëntasie gelei word, staan ons in ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe verhouding tot die wêreld. ‘n
Akkurate voorstelling (m.a.w. kennis vir ons) is om spesifieke vermoëns (perseptuele en
kognitiewe vermoëns) op ‘n spesifieke manier (epsitemiese oriëntasie) aan die wêreld te laat
pas.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/71595
Date12 1900
CreatorsVlerick, Michael Marie Patricia Lucien Hilda
ContributorsSmit, J. P., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.
PublisherStellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
Source SetsSouth African National ETD Portal
Languageen_ZA
Detected LanguageUnknown
TypeThesis
Formatxi, 201 p.
RightsStellenbosch University

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