A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 2017 / Powers theory is the view that some ontic or sparse properties are essentially powerful in the sense that they are “for” or “directed toward” certain manifestations. In this thesis, I consider in detail the idea that the nature of unmanifested dispositions generates serious difficulties for powers theory. I argue that extant arguments based on this idea do not succeed but also that a novel argument based on the idea does raise significant problems for powers theory and, especially, for dispositional essentialism – the version of powers theory on which some powers are fundamental natural properties.
In the first two chapters, I argue that on the most charitable interpretation the most plausible extant arguments from unmanifested dispositions against powers theory collapse into a single basic argument. The putative problem that this argument raises for powers theory is that some powers stand in a relation with manifestations that do not actually exist. In chapter three, I develop an argument from unmanifested dispositions that does not depend on this idea. According to this argument, unmanifested dispositions commit the powers theorist to the problematic idea that entities that do not actually exist have a sort of ontological priority over entities that actually exist. In chapter four, I argue that the arguments discussed in the first three chapters are seriously undermined by the fact that the “directedness” of a power instance need involve only the possibility of that power instance’s token manifestation and not the token manifestation itself. In chapters five and six, I use Kit Fine’s conception of ontological dependence to reformulate the argument developed in chapter three so that it gets around this difficulty. I argue that this argument provides good grounds to think that the dispositional essentialist is committed to the claim that unrealised possibilities have a significant sort of explanatory priority over concrete reality. This result is problematic for the dispositional essentialist, as this claim is strongly counterintuitive, entails the falsity of significant forms of ontological naturalism, and is inconsistent with important parts of the standard motivation for dispositional essentialism. / XL2018
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/24559 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Coates, Ashley Stephen |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | Online resource (vi, 218 leaves), application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document, application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document |
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