Is there a philosophically interesting connection between what and how we love and a
theory about the superlatively meaningful life? Love seems to me to be a particularly
intense, potent and expressive form of care. In my report I consider whether love of a
specific kind is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for a supremely significant
existence. I critique Harry Frankfurts subjectivist account that just so long as we love
something, anything, our lives are meaningful. In reply, I submit that there are three
conditions for the meaningful life: that we love something, that the something we love be
worth loving, and that we love this thing in the right kind of way. I consider Levys
contention that work, not love, is necessary for the most meaningful existence and reject
it because of the lack of consideration he gives to active engagement in our projects. I
conclude that it is love of a particular sort that grounds both a necessary and sufficient
conditions for the most meaningful life.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/4578 |
| Date | 07 March 2008 |
| Creators | Barrett, Andrew |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 533293 bytes, 43629 bytes, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf |
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