Rethinking the Maritime Strategy for the 1990s in terms of European security

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis reexamines the warfighting component of the Maritime Strategy in light of recent political changes in the communist world as well as recent arms control advances. The following conclusions are reached: first, a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement and the political changes in Eastern Europe will make mobilization and reinforcement key factors in any future European conflict. Secondly, under the conditions of a START agreement, it will no longer be necessary for the Soviet Union to form protected bastions to guard its SSBNs; seeking out and attacking Soviet SSBNs could be more risky and destabilizing. Thirdly, the START and CFE agreements, combined with improving Soviet submarine technology, will make the likelihood of a Soviet SLOC interdiction campaign much greater in the event of future conflict; the U.S. should adopt a layered defense strategy in response to these developments. Fourth and finally, because of the political difficulties associated with ground-based intermediate-range nuclear forces, the U.S. Navy must be assuming a larger role in providing theater nuclear deterrence in Europe.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:nps.edu/oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/30699
Date03 1900
CreatorsLyon, Wesley W.
ContributorsBreemer, Jan, Brown, Richard M., Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), Department of National Security Affairs
PublisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Source SetsNaval Postgraduate School
Languageen_US
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
RightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

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