ANNULMENT OF AWARDS UNDER THE WASHINGTON CONVENTION ON SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES The annulment mechanism plays a significant role in the system established by the Washington Convention. As a model of review, it strives to reconcile respect for the parties' desire to achieve final and efficient resolution of their dispute with the limited possibility to quash an award which is a product of a fundamentally flawed process. The existence of this exceptional opportunity to annul an award after its issuance has been widely recognized as an important factor in the success of ICSID as a platform for settlement of investment disputes. This thesis focuses on the issue of scope of review exercised by the ad hoc committees in annulment proceedings. The very first generation of ad hoc committees, represented by the annulment decisions in Amco I and Klöckner I, cast a shadow of doubt on ICSID's ability to transform its avowed dedication to the principle of finality into practice. Both of these decisions were accused of crossing the line between limited review anticipated by the Convention and substantive review typical for appellate systems. The primary ambition of this thesis is to explore the legitimacy of these concerns with respect to the current generation of ad hoc committees. Therefore, the first...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:325517 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | Ottingerová, Lucie |
| Contributors | Balaš, Vladimír, Šturma, Pavel |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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