Abstract. The outbreak of the novel coronavirus put democratic process, and security architecture across the globe in jeopardy. The global health crisis galvanised the proliferation of pandemic-related disinformation and other malign influence operations, and this phenomenon gave birth to a new buzzword, known as "infodemic". The "infodemic" provided hostile countries with a possibility to launch disinformation campaigns and other malign communication efforts, which in most cases were attributed to external state actors, such as China and Russia. Both actors aimed to weaken the legitimacy of European institutions, and undermine its democratic process. The "infodemic", thus, posed a threat to the EU's security and became a watershed moment in the disinformation discourse for the EU. In the aftermath, this mounting threat of disinformation was instantly acknowledged by EU representatives and institutions in their numerous official statements and policy documents. This dissertation examines the EU's approach towards Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns through the lenses of securitisation theory and evaluates the success of this process. The findings of the evaluation showcased that neither Russian nor Chinese disinformation was successfully securitised by the EU. It also argues that the EU has...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:451544 |
| Date | January 2021 |
| Creators | Chumenko, Viktoriia |
| Contributors | Hardman, Helen, Ludvík, Jan |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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