<p>This work aims to shed
new light on Augustine of Hippo’s mature dualistic view of the world, the
master argument he advanced in support of it, and how it was different from the
competing physicalist model that was both prevalent during his time and of
which he had earlier been a proponent. Specifically, it aims to understand
these topics in light of Augustine’s position on the relation of <i>nonphysical</i>
(or <i>incorporeal</i>) objects to space. This topic has yet to be extensively
discussed and the secondary claims one finds regarding the matter differ: for
some authors claim that Augustine did take nonphysical objects to be located in
space and others claim that he did not. I hold that part of the reason for the
lack of consensus on this topic is the reliance by each group of authors on
limited and distinct sets of direct quotations from Augustine’s writings. In
contrast to previous treatments, I approach Augustine’s position by way of his
account of <i>spatial location</i> and his account of <i>incorporeal</i>
objects. On these grounds, in addition to a more comprehensive set of direct
textual data, <i>Chapter 1</i> argues for <i>Modal~SLI</i> or the thesis that <i>pace</i>
the affirmative position and <i>beyond</i> the negative one, Augustine was
committed to the view that incorporeal objects generally, and God and human
souls in particular, not only <i>lack</i> spatial location – they <i>cannot</i>
be so located.<i> Chapter 2</i> argues from <i>Modal~SLI</i> in conjunction
with further forms of evidence, against <i>spatial readings</i> of Augustine’s
notion of <i>presence</i> and for a ca<i>usal account</i> (or <i>CP</i>). The
causal account holds that Augustine took presence <i>per se</i> to be a kind of
causal relation which does not require or entail spatially located <i>relata</i>.
On the basis of <i>CP</i> and <i>Modal~SLI</i> and additional forms of
evidence, <i>Chapter 3</i> argues against spatial readings and for a causal
analysis of Augustine’s argument from presence to the incorporeality of human
souls. <i>Chapter 4</i> argues on these same bases against the spatial reading
and for a causal analysis of Augustine’s argument from omnipresence to God’s
incorporeality. Additionally, <i>Chapters 3</i> and <i>4</i> contain extensive
discussions of the support that Augustine’s provides for the premises in each
of the arguments that is their focus. <i>Chapter 5</i>, which is the capstone
of this project, draws out the implications of earlier chapters to advance new
and more complete models of Augustine’s mature dualistic view of the world, the
rational basis upon which he endorsed the dualistic model and rejected the
competing physicalist one, and the comparative relations between his mature
model and the physicalist one. Among the conclusions it advances are the
following: (i) in including both physical and nonphysical objects Augustine’s
mature view includes objects that are and must be located in space and objects
that are not and cannot be located it space; (ii) in including God and human
souls as nonphysical objects it includes them as objects that are not and
cannot be located in space; (iii) causal claims (i.e., claims expressing causal
relations) were central drivers of Augustine’s personal transition from a
physicalist to a dualistic view of the world and were central elements of his
impersonal or public case against physicalism and for dualism; and (iv) the
dualist and physicalist models were similar in that each included physical
objects, objects with spatial location, and God and human souls; but they
differed in that unlike the physicalist model, the dualist model also included
nonphysical objects, objects without spatial location, and numbered God and
human souls as nonphysical objects and hence objects without spatial
locations. </p>
<br>
<p> </p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:purdue.edu/oai:figshare.com:article/14842398 |
| Date | 23 July 2021 |
| Creators | Joseph Emil Krylow IV (11022354) |
| Source Sets | Purdue University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis |
| Rights | CC BY 4.0 |
| Relation | https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/REJECTING_PHYSICALISM_A_CAUSAL_ANALYSIS_OF_AUGUSTINE_S_ARGUMENT_FROM_PRESENCE_TO_INCORPOREALITY/14842398 |
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