Is Spinoza's theory of truth a correspondence, coherence, or ontological theory? There is disagreement in Spinoza scholarship with regard to this question. Various scholars privilege different aspects of Spinoza's writings in order to make him a correspondence, coherence, or ontological theorist. But is there another reading of Spinoza that one could offer to bridge the gap between these different theories of truth? In this thesis I show that Spinoza's theory of truth is not exclusively correspondence, coherence, or ontological. On the reading I defend, Spinoza offers a theory of truth that is an amalgam of doctrines suited to the metaphysical commitments of his system.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:siu.edu/oai:opensiuc.lib.siu.edu:theses-1609 |
| Date | 01 May 2011 |
| Creators | Hamman, Jay |
| Publisher | OpenSIUC |
| Source Sets | Southern Illinois University Carbondale |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Theses |
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