Having begun from the assumption that our most fundamental way to relate to the world stems from an #I think# and that consciousness is at the center of this act, Edmund Husserl sets himself up for a very narrow and specialized view of human experience. In the end, such assumptions in the philosophical tradition and their terms often remain unquestioned and ingrained in a paradigm of discourse. My aim is to move beneath these assumptions-using Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological work-so as to, first, explicitly undermine the scope of Husserlian intentionality at its foundation and, second, decenter the subject in contemporary phenomenological literature. An account of human experience in terms of inner intentional content, I argue, yields an incomplete and misleading picture of our human involvements and we must ultimately move beyond the subject and its logic. The way we are always already being-in-the-world and embodied in the phenomenal texture of everydayness leaves the cogito one step behind.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ucf.edu/oai:stars.library.ucf.edu:honorstheses1990-2015-2837 |
| Date | 01 January 2014 |
| Creators | Diaz, Edgar |
| Publisher | STARS |
| Source Sets | University of Central Florida |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | HIM 1990-2015 |
Page generated in 0.0395 seconds