In this dissertation, I examine two main topics in corporate finance: executive compensation and corporate investment.
First, in the chapter titled “Import Penetration and Executive Compensation”, we investigate the impact of import penetration on executive compensation. We find that import penetration reduces executives’ total compensation, stock grants, and opportunistic grant timing, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms. Furthermore, we show that import penetration increases option grants and option duration, thus incentivizing more innovation and risk-taking.
Second, I study the relationship between entrenchment and corporate investment. In the chapter titled “Entrenchment, Managerial Shirking, and Investment”, I find that entrenchment reduces capital expenditures, R&D, and productivity, weakens a firm’s competitiveness in the product market, and diminishes firm value. These findings are consistent with the shirking hypothesis that entrenchment enables managers to evade the responsibilities of overseeing investment projects.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uiowa.edu/oai:ir.uiowa.edu:etd-8550 |
| Date | 01 August 2019 |
| Creators | Yang, Keyang |
| Contributors | Lie, Erik |
| Publisher | University of Iowa |
| Source Sets | University of Iowa |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Theses and Dissertations |
| Rights | Copyright © 2019 Keyang Yang |
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