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Mobile agent security through multi-agent cryptographic protocols.

An increasingly promising and widespread topic of research in distributed computing is the mobile agent paradigm: code travelling and performing computations on remote hosts in an autonomous manner. One of the biggest challenges faced by this new paradigm is security. The issue of protecting sensitive code and data carried by a mobile agent against tampering from a malicious host is particularly hard but important. Based on secure multi-party computation, a recent research direction shows the feasibility of a software-only solution to this problem, which had been deemed impossible by some researchers previously. The best result prior to this dissertation is a single-agent protocol which requires the participation of a trusted third party. Our research employs multi-agent protocols to eliminate the trusted third party, resulting in a protocol with minimum trust assumptions. This dissertation presents one of the first formal definitions of secure mobile agent computation, in which the privacy and integrity of the agent code and data as well as the data provided by the host are all protected. We present secure protocols for mobile agent computation against static, semi-honest or malicious adversaries without relying on any third party or trusting any specific participant in the system. The security of our protocols is formally proven through standard proof technique and according to our formal definition of security. Our second result is a more practical agent protocol with strong security against most real-world host attacks. The security features are carefully analyzed, and the practicality is demonstrated through implementation and experimental study on a real-world mobile agent platform. All these protocols rely heavily on well-established cryptographic primitives, such as encrypted circuits, threshold decryption, and oblivious transfer. Our study of these tools yields new contributions to the general field of cryptography. Particularly, we correct a well-known construction of the encrypted circuit and give one of the first provably secure implementations of the encrypted circuit.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:unt.edu/info:ark/67531/metadc4473
Date05 1900
CreatorsXu, Ke
ContributorsTate, Stephen R., Mikler, Armin R., Dantu, Ram
PublisherUniversity of North Texas
Source SetsUniversity of North Texas
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis or Dissertation
FormatText
RightsPublic, Copyright, Xu, Ke, Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved.

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