viii, 151 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / Current realist explanations of why states decide to develop nuclear weapons
cannot account for the behavior of states that lack a clear strategic threat. An alternative
explanation is necessary to explain such behavior. I argue that domestic regimes in states
with no clear strategic threat may develop nuclear weapons in order to ensure their
survival. Such regimes are internationally isolated, under pressure from major powers in
the international system and possess some preexisting nuclear capacity. Under these
conditions, increasing domestic instability causes regimes to pursue a course of nuclear
development. Nuclear weapons allow a regime to change the preferences of the great
powers that would otherwise prefer to see the regime overthrown. If the regime
possesses nuclear weapons, because of the costs and risks associated with those weapons,
the great power will favor maintenance of the status quo and may even prop up a regime
it intensely dislikes. / Committee in Charge:
Lars Skalnes, Chair;
Jane Cramer;
Mikhail Myagkov
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uoregon.edu/oai:scholarsbank.uoregon.edu:1794/9975 |
| Date | 09 1900 |
| Creators | Beasley, Matthew |
| Publisher | University of Oregon |
| Source Sets | University of Oregon |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Relation | University of Oregon theses, Dept. of Political Science, M.S., 2009; |
Page generated in 0.0018 seconds