Modern automobiles have been proven vulnerable to hacking by security researchers. By exploiting vulnerabilities in the car's external interfaces, attackers can access a car's controller area network (CAN) bus and cause malicious effects. We seek to detect these attacks on the bus as a last line of defence against automotive cyber attacks. The CAN bus standard defines a low-level message structure, upon which manufacturers layer their own proprietary command protocols; attacks must similarly be tailored for their target. This variability makes intrusion detection methods difficult to apply to the automotive CAN bus. Nevertheless, the bus traffic is generated by machines; thus we hypothesize that it can be characterized with machine learning, and that attacks produce anomalous traffic. Our goals are to show that anomaly detection trained without understanding of the message contents can detect attacks, and to create a framework for understanding how the characteristics of a novel attack can be used to predict its detectability.
We developed a model that describes attacks based on their effect on bus traffic, informed by a review of published material on car hacking in combination with analysis of CAN traffic from a 2012 Subaru Impreza. The model specifies three high-level categories of effects: attacks that insert foreign packets, attacks that affect packet timing, and attacks that only modify data within packets. Foreign packet attacks are trivially detectable. For timing-based anomalies, we developed features suitable for one-class classification methods. For packet stream data word anomalies, we adapted recurrent neural networks and multivariate Markov model methods to sequence anomaly detection and compared their performance.
We conducted experiments to evaluate our detection methods with special attention to the trade-off between precision and recall, given that a practical system requires a very low false alarm rate. The methods were evaluated by synthesizing anomalies within each attack category, parameterized to adjust their covertness. We generalize from the results to enable prediction of detection rates for new attacks using these methods.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uottawa.ca/oai:ruor.uottawa.ca:10393/36120 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Taylor, Adrian |
| Contributors | Japkowicz, Nathalie, Leblanc, Sylvain |
| Publisher | Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa |
| Source Sets | Université d’Ottawa |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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