This study clarifies how family firms use the vesting provision of incentive grants and calibrate the interests of non-family executives so that they merge better with the firms’ interests. Given the risks that family firms confront when they are considering strategic decisions, this study finds that family-owned firms provide more risk-based incentives to their non-family executives, primarily when the firms are performing below their aspirational level. Moreover, these firms rely more often on relative performance measures to assess the efficacy of their non-family executives as their performance deteriorates. These findings stand in stark contrast with the literature on this topic, which suggests that firms always use risk-based incentives and absolute performance measures to reward their executives regardless of the firms’ performance.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uottawa.ca/oai:ruor.uottawa.ca:10393/41113 |
| Date | 28 September 2020 |
| Creators | Datta, Amlan |
| Contributors | Jaskiewicz, Peter |
| Publisher | Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa |
| Source Sets | Université d’Ottawa |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
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