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Showing 1 to 20 of 35 for “"Optimal Contracts"”.

  1. Optimal contracts for trade restrictions

    … or low domestic industry to determine socially optimal levels of imports. The results are shown to depend on whether firms in the domestic industry are represented by a trade organization. When firms act independently the optimal contract is costless for the government and two different types of …

    rice Repository record for Optimal contracts for trade restrictions (opens in a new tab)

  2. Optimal Contracts for Legal Services

    This dissertation characterizes optimal contracts for legal services in the presence of asymmetric information. The lawyer-client relationship examined is an application of the general principal-agent problem. The agent (lawyer) takes an action that, together with the realization of a random …

    uiuc Repository record for Optimal Contracts for Legal Services (opens in a new tab)

  3. Essays on Optimal Contracts with Overconfidence

    … about their productivity. I derive the optimal contracts for both a monopsonistic market, where one firm makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to the workers, as well as a competitive market, where many firms compete for the services of workers. Overconfidence causes the optimal contract to …

    washington Repository record for Essays on Optimal Contracts with Overconfidence (opens in a new tab)

  4. Livestock Risk Protection: An Analysis of Coverage Length and Level to Determine Optimal Contract Selection

    We evaluate the historically optimal producer-selected coverage options comprised of coverage length and level for each marketing month for various types of livestock insured with Livestock Risk Protection insurance. We begin with feeder cattle steers (600-900lbs) and then analyze the other types …

    utahstate Repository record for Livestock Risk Protection: An Analysis of Coverage Length and Level to Determine Optimal Contract Selection (opens in a new tab)

  5. Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design

    My dissertation investigates optimal contracts for experimentation and a matching problem for the runway slot allocation. The first chapter of my dissertation examines the role of monitoring in experimentation where agents may observe success privately. In the benchmark model without monitoring, …

    washington Repository record for Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design (opens in a new tab)

  6. Non-monetary and informal compensation in agency settings

    In the prior agency literature, the optimal compensation contracts generally specify cash payments that are functions of verifiable performance measures, which can be enforced by the courts. However, the compensation we observe in the real world often includes non-cash components like fringe …

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  7. Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship

    <p>I characterize optimal long term contracts offered by a monopolist to a buyer whose private valuation evolves according to a branching process with privately known transition probability. The optimal contract can be implemented in a simple way, and presents the buyer with a tradeoff between a …

    duke Repository record for Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship (opens in a new tab)

  8. Sourcing and outsourcing of materials and services in chemical supply chains

    … comprehensive classification of material supply contracts and address the strategic and integrated sourcing and distribution of materials in a global business environment for a MNC, which are key planning decisions in many supply chains including the chemical. We present a systematic and …

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  9. ESSAYS IN MECHANISM DESIGN

    … reservation utility is low (such as in principal-optimal contracts). However, the FOA holds when the agent’s reservation utility is at least moderately high (such as in competitive settings where agents receive high rents). Second, our main theorem formally shows that the FOA is valid in a …

    penn Repository record for ESSAYS IN MECHANISM DESIGN (opens in a new tab)

  10. Risk Sharing and Risk Aggregation via Risk Measures

    … special form of subadditivity. Then, the Pareto-optimal risk sharing problem is solved through explicit construction. We also study risk sharing in a competitive market and obtain an explicit Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Robustness and comonotonicity of optimal allocations are investigated, and …

    waterloo Repository record for Risk Sharing and Risk Aggregation via Risk Measures (opens in a new tab)

  11. Contract-theoretic Demand Response Management in Smart Grid Systems

    … market's utility, while jointly guaranteeing the optimal satisfaction of the prosumers, under the scenarios of complete and incomplete information from the electricity market's perspective regarding knowing or not the prosumers' types, respectively. The corresponding optimization problems are …

    unm Repository record for Contract-theoretic Demand Response Management in Smart Grid Systems (opens in a new tab)

  12. Essays in applied microeconomic theory

    … should be more tolerant. The third chapter, “Optimal Contracts with Personal Agenda”, studies dynamic contracting problems between a principal and an agent. In each of the two periods, the agent chooses a project among three. The agent’s personal agenda conflicts with the principal’s …

    bu Repository record for Essays in applied microeconomic theory (opens in a new tab)

  13. Implicit labour contracts in hierarchical firms : some theoretical considerations

    … The focus point is on the characteristics of the optimal contracts that are implicitiy entered into between the two parties. The role of hierarchical firms in the collection of information about the worker's abiUty is investigated. It is shown that, when the firm uses this information to decide …

    anu Repository record for Implicit labour contracts in hierarchical firms : some theoretical considerations (opens in a new tab)

  14. Essays in contract theory, information, and stochastic analysis

    … a unified framework for delegated investment and optimal contracting in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium, building on and extending foundational models in the literature. Portfolio managers acquire costly information about asset payoffs while incurring portfolio management costs, and make …

    bu Repository record for Essays in contract theory, information, and stochastic analysis (opens in a new tab)

  15. Human Capital, Contracts and Worker-Firm Attachment in the US Labor Market

    … and counteroffers where firms may sign long-term contracts with workers that jointly determine wages and costly training (human capital acquisition). For any amount of training, some fraction of the human capital acquired is job-specific and is lost upon job termination. Estimating returns to …

    umn Repository record for Human Capital, Contracts and Worker-Firm Attachment in the US Labor Market (opens in a new tab)

  16. Dynamic Contracting With Unobserved Progress

    … reward for the final success. Two properties of optimal contracts are identified. First, conditional on the termination date, the optimal contract induces efficient actions from the agent. Second, the reward for success to the agent is in general non-monotone in success time and later success may …

    penn Repository record for Dynamic Contracting With Unobserved Progress (opens in a new tab)

  17. Three essays on health economics: Theoretical and experimental evidence on physician behavior

    … are present. In Chapter 1, we analyze how optimal contracts could align the incentives of a physician and a third-party payer in a principal-agent model for drug prescription with non-compliant patients. The physician exerts an effort level during the prescription process, which can …

    rosario Repository record for Three essays on health economics: Theoretical and experimental evidence on physician behavior (opens in a new tab)

  18. Essays on the theory of incentives : procurement, franchise & innovation contracts

    … of type-dependent reservation utility on the optimality of linear contracts in a Principal-Agent model of procurement. Type-dependency of reservation utility, combined with the requirements of individual rationality and incentive compatibility in the principal's contracts induces a …

    anu Repository record for Essays on the theory of incentives : procurement, franchise & innovation contracts (opens in a new tab)

  19. Essays in corporate finance

    … insurers. In the third essay, I examine optimal contracting with risk averse managers. I start from the following observations: (1) managers select projects and exert effort; (2) risk averse managers make distorted project selection decisions, and this problem is increasing in risk …

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