{"id":{"repo_id":"athens","oai_identifier":"oai:lib.uoa.gr:uoadl:5452715"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/athens/oai:lib.uoa.gr:uoadl:5452715","repository":{"repo_id":"athens","name":"National and Kapodistrian University of Athens","base_url":"https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/frontend/oaipmh"},"display":{"title":"The Forward-looking Ethics in Epictetus","abstract":"This thesis examines the forward-looking orientation of Epictetus’ ethics through the relationship between prohairesis, freedom, and moral character. Through close readings of the Discourses, with Aristotle and early Stoicism serving as comparative frameworks, it argues that Epictetus shifts the focus of action theory from causal explanation and retrospective attribution toward the first-person standpoint of an agent confronting a present choice. The analysis first shows how Epictetus locates moral agency in the use of impressions, identifying prohairesis with an inviolable self whose moral integrity does not depend on external outcomes. It distinguishes the inherent freedom of prohairesis from external coercion from the ethical freedom achieved through its proper exercise. This distinction explains how a faculty that cannot be overcome by external forces can nevertheless corrupt itself through its own judgments. The thesis then argues that moral character and prohairesis share a reflexive structure: character both informs an agent’s choices and becomes the object of reflection and transformation through those choices. Self-respect, a sense of shame, and the agent’s understanding of their own character guide this second-order scrutiny. Prohairesis thus encompasses not merely isolated decisions, but the agent’s capacity to examine, preserve, and shape the self expressed in action. Finally, the thesis clarifies that this first-person orientation entails neither subjective moral standards nor a rejection of Stoic determinism. The agent’s reflective activity remains answerable to objective rational norms and compatible with providential order. Epictetus’ forward-looking ethics therefore concerns the reflective exercise of agency at the moment of choice, rather than the prediction or control of future events. This shift in perspective constitutes a substantive philosophical contribution: it connects freedom and moral development to the agent’s ongoing examination and formation of the self.","abstract_html":"This thesis examines the forward-looking orientation of Epictetus’ ethics through the relationship between prohairesis, freedom, and moral character. Through close readings of the Discourses, with Aristotle and early Stoicism serving as comparative frameworks, it argues that Epictetus shifts the focus of action theory from causal explanation and retrospective attribution toward the first-person standpoint of an agent confronting a present choice. The analysis first shows how Epictetus locates moral agency in the use of impressions, identifying prohairesis with an inviolable self whose moral integrity does not depend on external outcomes. It distinguishes the inherent freedom of prohairesis from external coercion from the ethical freedom achieved through its proper exercise. This distinction explains how a faculty that cannot be overcome by external forces can nevertheless corrupt itself through its own judgments. The thesis then argues that moral character and prohairesis share a reflexive structure: character both informs an agent’s choices and becomes the object of reflection and transformation through those choices. Self-respect, a sense of shame, and the agent’s understanding of their own character guide this second-order scrutiny. Prohairesis thus encompasses not merely isolated decisions, but the agent’s capacity to examine, preserve, and shape the self expressed in action. Finally, the thesis clarifies that this first-person orientation entails neither subjective moral standards nor a rejection of Stoic determinism. The agent’s reflective activity remains answerable to objective rational norms and compatible with providential order. Epictetus’ forward-looking ethics therefore concerns the reflective exercise of agency at the moment of choice, rather than the prediction or control of future events. This shift in perspective constitutes a substantive philosophical contribution: it connects freedom and moral development to the agent’s ongoing examination and formation of the self.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["FENG YILIN"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026","date_published":"2026","updated_at":"2026-11-19T05:20:52Z","subjects":["Θετικές Επιστήμες","Science"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["uoadl:5452715"],"render_values":[{"text":"uoadl:5452715","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5452715","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5452715","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/frontend/oaipmh?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai%3Alib.uoa.gr%3Auoadl%3A5452715","prefix":"oai_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["FENG YILIN"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["born_digital_postgraduate_thesis","Διπλωματική Εργασία","Postgraduate Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Θετικές Επιστήμες","Science"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["uoadl:5452715","https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5452715"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This thesis examines the forward-looking orientation of Epictetus’ ethics through the relationship between prohairesis, freedom, and moral character. Through close readings of the Discourses, with Aristotle and early Stoicism serving as comparative frameworks, it argues that Epictetus shifts the focus of action theory from causal explanation and retrospective attribution toward the first-person standpoint of an agent confronting a present choice. The analysis first shows how Epictetus locates moral agency in the use of impressions, identifying prohairesis with an inviolable self whose moral integrity does not depend on external outcomes. It distinguishes the inherent freedom of prohairesis from external coercion from the ethical freedom achieved through its proper exercise. This distinction explains how a faculty that cannot be overcome by external forces can nevertheless corrupt itself through its own judgments. The thesis then argues that moral character and prohairesis share a reflexive structure: character both informs an agent’s choices and becomes the object of reflection and transformation through those choices. Self-respect, a sense of shame, and the agent’s understanding of their own character guide this second-order scrutiny. Prohairesis thus encompasses not merely isolated decisions, but the agent’s capacity to examine, preserve, and shape the self expressed in action. Finally, the thesis clarifies that this first-person orientation entails neither subjective moral standards nor a rejection of Stoic determinism. The agent’s reflective activity remains answerable to objective rational norms and compatible with providential order. Epictetus’ forward-looking ethics therefore concerns the reflective exercise of agency at the moment of choice, rather than the prediction or control of future events. This shift in perspective constitutes a substantive philosophical contribution: it connects freedom and moral development to the agent’s ongoing examination and formation of the self."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Forward-looking Ethics in Epictetus"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["FENG YILIN"],"dc:date":["2026"],"dc:description":["This thesis examines the forward-looking orientation of Epictetus’ ethics through the relationship between prohairesis, freedom, and moral character. Through close readings of the Discourses, with Aristotle and early Stoicism serving as comparative frameworks, it argues that Epictetus shifts the focus of action theory from causal explanation and retrospective attribution toward the first-person standpoint of an agent confronting a present choice. The analysis first shows how Epictetus locates moral agency in the use of impressions, identifying prohairesis with an inviolable self whose moral integrity does not depend on external outcomes. It distinguishes the inherent freedom of prohairesis from external coercion from the ethical freedom achieved through its proper exercise. This distinction explains how a faculty that cannot be overcome by external forces can nevertheless corrupt itself through its own judgments. The thesis then argues that moral character and prohairesis share a reflexive structure: character both informs an agent’s choices and becomes the object of reflection and transformation through those choices. Self-respect, a sense of shame, and the agent’s understanding of their own character guide this second-order scrutiny. Prohairesis thus encompasses not merely isolated decisions, but the agent’s capacity to examine, preserve, and shape the self expressed in action. Finally, the thesis clarifies that this first-person orientation entails neither subjective moral standards nor a rejection of Stoic determinism. The agent’s reflective activity remains answerable to objective rational norms and compatible with providential order. Epictetus’ forward-looking ethics therefore concerns the reflective exercise of agency at the moment of choice, rather than the prediction or control of future events. This shift in perspective constitutes a substantive philosophical contribution: it connects freedom and moral development to the agent’s ongoing examination and formation of the self."],"dc:identifier":["uoadl:5452715","https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5452715"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:subject":["Θετικές Επιστήμες","Science"],"dc:title":["The Forward-looking Ethics in Epictetus"],"dc:type":["born_digital_postgraduate_thesis","Διπλωματική Εργασία","Postgraduate Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T05:20:52Z"}