{"id":{"repo_id":"birmingham","oai_identifier":"oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:11367"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/birmingham/oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:11367","repository":{"repo_id":"birmingham","name":"University of Birmingham","base_url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"An exploration of the evil-god challenge","abstract":"The Evil-god challenge attempts to undermine classical monotheism by contending that because belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-malevolent God (the Evil-god hypothesis) is similarly reasonable to belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God (the Good-god hypothesis), the onus is on the classical monotheist to justify their belief in the latter hypothesis over the former hypothesis. This thesis explores the Evil-god challenge by detailing the history and recent developments of the challenge; distinguishing between different types of Evil-god challenge; responding to several prominent objections to the challenge; and applying the challenge to philosophical arguments for the existence of God. I also evaluate the efficacy of parallel arguments as a whole, with a view to determining the parameters of the Evil-god challenge by laying out exactly which theistic positions are irrevocably undermined by it. I conclude that the Evil-god challenge effectively damages several arguments for the existence of God and, in cases where it does not straightforwardly do so, it nevertheless reduces the Good-god theist’s belief to one or more intuitions.","abstract_html":"The Evil-god challenge attempts to undermine classical monotheism by contending that because belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-malevolent God (the Evil-god hypothesis) is similarly reasonable to belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God (the Good-god hypothesis), the onus is on the classical monotheist to justify their belief in the latter hypothesis over the former hypothesis. This thesis explores the Evil-god challenge by detailing the history and recent developments of the challenge; distinguishing between different types of Evil-god challenge; responding to several prominent objections to the challenge; and applying the challenge to philosophical arguments for the existence of God. I also evaluate the efficacy of parallel arguments as a whole, with a view to determining the parameters of the Evil-god challenge by laying out exactly which theistic positions are irrevocably undermined by it. I conclude that the Evil-god challenge effectively damages several arguments for the existence of God and, in cases where it does not straightforwardly do so, it nevertheless reduces the Good-god theist’s belief to one or more intuitions.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Lancaster-Thomas, Asha"],"institution":"University of Birmingham","degree_name":"d_ph","degree_level":"d_ph","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-07","date_published":"2021-07","updated_at":"2026-11-19T09:31:21Z","subjects":["B Philosophy (General)","BL Religion"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[{"key":"person:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000000270544842"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0002-7054-4842","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7054-4842","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null,"record_url":null,"record_label":null,"record_kind":null,"record_source":null,"download_url":"http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/11367/7/Lancaster-Thomas2021PhD.pdf","download_label":"Download PDF","download_source":"dc:identifier.uri","access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=uketd_dc&identifier=oai%3Aetheses.bham.ac.uk%3A11367","prefix":"uketd_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["na"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Lancaster-Thomas, Asha"]},{"key":"person:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000000270544842"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2021-07-01"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2021-07"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["College of Arts & Law","Department of Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Birmingham"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/11367/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["d_ph"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["d_ph"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["B Philosophy (General)","BL Religion"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2","label":"Language (ISO 639-2)","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/11367/7/Lancaster-Thomas2021PhD.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The Evil-god challenge attempts to undermine classical monotheism by contending that because belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-malevolent God (the Evil-god hypothesis) is similarly reasonable to belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God (the Good-god hypothesis), the onus is on the classical monotheist to justify their belief in the latter hypothesis over the former hypothesis. This thesis explores the Evil-god challenge by detailing the history and recent developments of the challenge; distinguishing between different types of Evil-god challenge; responding to several prominent objections to the challenge; and applying the challenge to philosophical arguments for the existence of God. I also evaluate the efficacy of parallel arguments as a whole, with a view to determining the parameters of the Evil-god challenge by laying out exactly which theistic positions are irrevocably undermined by it. I conclude that the Evil-god challenge effectively damages several arguments for the existence of God and, in cases where it does not straightforwardly do so, it nevertheless reduces the Good-god theist’s belief to one or more intuitions."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["text"]},{"key":"dcterms:accessrights","label":"Dcterms Accessrights","values":["public"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["An exploration of the evil-god challenge"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.sponsor":["na"],"dc:creator":["Lancaster-Thomas, Asha"],"dc:date":["2021-07-01"],"dc:date.issued":["2021-07"],"dc:description.abstract":["The Evil-god challenge attempts to undermine classical monotheism by contending that because belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-malevolent God (the Evil-god hypothesis) is similarly reasonable to belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God (the Good-god hypothesis), the onus is on the classical monotheist to justify their belief in the latter hypothesis over the former hypothesis. This thesis explores the Evil-god challenge by detailing the history and recent developments of the challenge; distinguishing between different types of Evil-god challenge; responding to several prominent objections to the challenge; and applying the challenge to philosophical arguments for the existence of God. I also evaluate the efficacy of parallel arguments as a whole, with a view to determining the parameters of the Evil-god challenge by laying out exactly which theistic positions are irrevocably undermined by it. 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