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In the first part of this thesis, we show how the attempt to make computers more efficient by dynamically responding to their energy needs has created a new attack surface. Specifically, we are able to retrieve keys from both an AES and a RSA cryptographic process running inside an SGX enclave by lowering the operating voltage. We further investigate the undervolting effect and are able to improve the attack to create an out-of-bounds under/overflow. Meanwhile, fault injection attacks (such as our software undervolting one) represent a major threat to Internet-of-Things and embedded devices. As of today, evaluating to what extent a device is susceptible to fault injection is a mostly manual process, requiring significant expert knowledge and often expensive, complex lab equipment. In addition, even if a fault can be induced, it is often unclear which effect caused the incorrect output. 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And, more recently, hardware-based trusted execution environments such as Software Guard Extensions (SGX) have been created with the promise of securely executing sensitive processes—thus protecting the data and running computations from a root adversary. In the first part of this thesis, we show how the attempt to make computers more efficient by dynamically responding to their energy needs has created a new attack surface. Specifically, we are able to retrieve keys from both an AES and a RSA cryptographic process running inside an SGX enclave by lowering the operating voltage. We further investigate the undervolting effect and are able to improve the attack to create an out-of-bounds under/overflow. Meanwhile, fault injection attacks (such as our software undervolting one) represent a major threat to Internet-of-Things and embedded devices. As of today, evaluating to what extent a device is susceptible to fault injection is a mostly manual process, requiring significant expert knowledge and often expensive, complex lab equipment. In addition, even if a fault can be induced, it is often unclear which effect caused the incorrect output. In the second part of this thesis, we address this difficulty by designing and building a performant, exhaustive fault injection tool. 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