{"id":{"repo_id":"birmingham","oai_identifier":"oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:14596"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/birmingham/oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:14596","repository":{"repo_id":"birmingham","name":"University of Birmingham","base_url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"Social and non-social reasoning in relation to autism and autistic traits","abstract":"Four experiments examined reasoning and decision-making tendencies across social and non-social domains in relation to autism and autistic traits in adults. Experiments were created to measure forced-choice judgments and written justifications in a comparison paradigm of social and non-social scenario-based domains. Three experiments used a scenario-based task to measure moral reasoning, while one experiment focused specifically on causal reasoning with a task following a common cause network structure. Dual Process Theories propose a distinction between two types of information processing: intuition and deliberation. Intuition represents a quicker and more automatic process, while deliberation represents a slower and more effortful process. Following this notion, the Dual Process Theory of Autism suggests a tendency of greater deliberation and less intuition in decision-making and reasoning among autistic people and those with high autistic traits. To test this hypothesis across domains to see whether these tendencies are domain-specific or domain-general, three experiments (Experiment 1, 2, and 4) recruited participants from the general population and measured their levels of autistic traits. One experiment (Experiment 3) recruited autistic and well-matched non-autistic participants for a between group comparison. Experiment 1 found a relationship between higher autistic traits and a greater reliance on deliberation for forced-choice moral judgments within the social domain, and not the non-social domain. However, Experiment 2, using a modified version of the same task, did not reveal such a relationship, which was supported with participants’ written justifications. Experiment 3 used the first version of the same task and found no meaningful differences between autistic and matched non-autistic people in their moral judgments. Experiment 3 revealed subjective yet not objective differences between groups in their reasoning and decision-making, suggesting a subjective preference for and performance in reduced intuition among autistic people. Finally, Experiment 4 revealed no substantial differences in levels of autistic traits between participants, clustered as decisive and indecisive reasoners, based on their reasoning tendencies. Consistently, across all experiments, a distinction between social and non-social domains in terms of reasoning and decision-making was found. Taken together, this thesis suggests that there is strong evidence for a distinction between social and non-social domains in reasoning and decision-making. However, this thesis does not provide strong evidence for a greater deliberation and less intuition associated with a diagnosis of autism or high autistic traits. Nevertheless, mismatch between subjective and objective reasoning and decision-making among autistic people might suggest meta-cognitive differences to non-autistic people, rather than a difference in reasoning and decision-making.","abstract_html":"Four experiments examined reasoning and decision-making tendencies across social and non-social domains in relation to autism and autistic traits in adults. Experiments were created to measure forced-choice judgments and written justifications in a comparison paradigm of social and non-social scenario-based domains. Three experiments used a scenario-based task to measure moral reasoning, while one experiment focused specifically on causal reasoning with a task following a common cause network structure. Dual Process Theories propose a distinction between two types of information processing: intuition and deliberation. Intuition represents a quicker and more automatic process, while deliberation represents a slower and more effortful process. Following this notion, the Dual Process Theory of Autism suggests a tendency of greater deliberation and less intuition in decision-making and reasoning among autistic people and those with high autistic traits. To test this hypothesis across domains to see whether these tendencies are domain-specific or domain-general, three experiments (Experiment 1, 2, and 4) recruited participants from the general population and measured their levels of autistic traits. One experiment (Experiment 3) recruited autistic and well-matched non-autistic participants for a between group comparison. Experiment 1 found a relationship between higher autistic traits and a greater reliance on deliberation for forced-choice moral judgments within the social domain, and not the non-social domain. However, Experiment 2, using a modified version of the same task, did not reveal such a relationship, which was supported with participants’ written justifications. Experiment 3 used the first version of the same task and found no meaningful differences between autistic and matched non-autistic people in their moral judgments. Experiment 3 revealed subjective yet not objective differences between groups in their reasoning and decision-making, suggesting a subjective preference for and performance in reduced intuition among autistic people. Finally, Experiment 4 revealed no substantial differences in levels of autistic traits between participants, clustered as decisive and indecisive reasoners, based on their reasoning tendencies. Consistently, across all experiments, a distinction between social and non-social domains in terms of reasoning and decision-making was found. Taken together, this thesis suggests that there is strong evidence for a distinction between social and non-social domains in reasoning and decision-making. However, this thesis does not provide strong evidence for a greater deliberation and less intuition associated with a diagnosis of autism or high autistic traits. Nevertheless, mismatch between subjective and objective reasoning and decision-making among autistic people might suggest meta-cognitive differences to non-autistic people, rather than a difference in reasoning and decision-making.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Bastan, Elif"],"institution":"University of Birmingham","degree_name":"d_ph","degree_level":"d_ph","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-07","date_published":"2024-07","updated_at":"2026-11-19T09:32:40Z","subjects":["BF Psychology"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[{"key":"person:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000000278707933"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0002-7870-7933","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7870-7933","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null,"record_url":null,"record_label":null,"record_kind":null,"record_source":null,"download_url":"http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/14596/13/Bastan2024PhD.pdf","download_label":"Download PDF","download_source":"dc:identifier.uri","access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=uketd_dc&identifier=oai%3Aetheses.bham.ac.uk%3A14596","prefix":"uketd_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["other"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Bastan, Elif"]},{"key":"person:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000000278707933"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2024-07"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2024-07"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["College of Life & Environmental Sciences","School of Psychology"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Birmingham"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/14596/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["d_ph"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["d_ph"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["BF Psychology"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2","label":"Language (ISO 639-2)","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/14596/13/Bastan2024PhD.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Four experiments examined reasoning and decision-making tendencies across social and non-social domains in relation to autism and autistic traits in adults. Experiments were created to measure forced-choice judgments and written justifications in a comparison paradigm of social and non-social scenario-based domains. Three experiments used a scenario-based task to measure moral reasoning, while one experiment focused specifically on causal reasoning with a task following a common cause network structure. Dual Process Theories propose a distinction between two types of information processing: intuition and deliberation. Intuition represents a quicker and more automatic process, while deliberation represents a slower and more effortful process. Following this notion, the Dual Process Theory of Autism suggests a tendency of greater deliberation and less intuition in decision-making and reasoning among autistic people and those with high autistic traits. To test this hypothesis across domains to see whether these tendencies are domain-specific or domain-general, three experiments (Experiment 1, 2, and 4) recruited participants from the general population and measured their levels of autistic traits. One experiment (Experiment 3) recruited autistic and well-matched non-autistic participants for a between group comparison. Experiment 1 found a relationship between higher autistic traits and a greater reliance on deliberation for forced-choice moral judgments within the social domain, and not the non-social domain. However, Experiment 2, using a modified version of the same task, did not reveal such a relationship, which was supported with participants’ written justifications. Experiment 3 used the first version of the same task and found no meaningful differences between autistic and matched non-autistic people in their moral judgments. Experiment 3 revealed subjective yet not objective differences between groups in their reasoning and decision-making, suggesting a subjective preference for and performance in reduced intuition among autistic people. Finally, Experiment 4 revealed no substantial differences in levels of autistic traits between participants, clustered as decisive and indecisive reasoners, based on their reasoning tendencies. Consistently, across all experiments, a distinction between social and non-social domains in terms of reasoning and decision-making was found. Taken together, this thesis suggests that there is strong evidence for a distinction between social and non-social domains in reasoning and decision-making. However, this thesis does not provide strong evidence for a greater deliberation and less intuition associated with a diagnosis of autism or high autistic traits. Nevertheless, mismatch between subjective and objective reasoning and decision-making among autistic people might suggest meta-cognitive differences to non-autistic people, rather than a difference in reasoning and decision-making."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["text"]},{"key":"dcterms:accessrights","label":"Dcterms Accessrights","values":["public"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Social and non-social reasoning in relation to autism and autistic traits"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.sponsor":["other"],"dc:creator":["Bastan, Elif"],"dc:date":["2024-07"],"dc:date.issued":["2024-07"],"dc:description.abstract":["Four experiments examined reasoning and decision-making tendencies across social and non-social domains in relation to autism and autistic traits in adults. Experiments were created to measure forced-choice judgments and written justifications in a comparison paradigm of social and non-social scenario-based domains. Three experiments used a scenario-based task to measure moral reasoning, while one experiment focused specifically on causal reasoning with a task following a common cause network structure. Dual Process Theories propose a distinction between two types of information processing: intuition and deliberation. Intuition represents a quicker and more automatic process, while deliberation represents a slower and more effortful process. Following this notion, the Dual Process Theory of Autism suggests a tendency of greater deliberation and less intuition in decision-making and reasoning among autistic people and those with high autistic traits. To test this hypothesis across domains to see whether these tendencies are domain-specific or domain-general, three experiments (Experiment 1, 2, and 4) recruited participants from the general population and measured their levels of autistic traits. One experiment (Experiment 3) recruited autistic and well-matched non-autistic participants for a between group comparison. Experiment 1 found a relationship between higher autistic traits and a greater reliance on deliberation for forced-choice moral judgments within the social domain, and not the non-social domain. However, Experiment 2, using a modified version of the same task, did not reveal such a relationship, which was supported with participants’ written justifications. Experiment 3 used the first version of the same task and found no meaningful differences between autistic and matched non-autistic people in their moral judgments. Experiment 3 revealed subjective yet not objective differences between groups in their reasoning and decision-making, suggesting a subjective preference for and performance in reduced intuition among autistic people. Finally, Experiment 4 revealed no substantial differences in levels of autistic traits between participants, clustered as decisive and indecisive reasoners, based on their reasoning tendencies. Consistently, across all experiments, a distinction between social and non-social domains in terms of reasoning and decision-making was found. Taken together, this thesis suggests that there is strong evidence for a distinction between social and non-social domains in reasoning and decision-making. However, this thesis does not provide strong evidence for a greater deliberation and less intuition associated with a diagnosis of autism or high autistic traits. Nevertheless, mismatch between subjective and objective reasoning and decision-making among autistic people might suggest meta-cognitive differences to non-autistic people, rather than a difference in reasoning and decision-making."],"dc:format":["text"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/14596/13/Bastan2024PhD.pdf"],"dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2":["eng"],"dc:publisher.department":["College of Life & Environmental Sciences","School of Psychology"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Birmingham"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/14596/"],"dc:subject":["BF Psychology"],"dcterms:accessrights":["public"],"dc:title":["Social and non-social reasoning in relation to autism and autistic traits"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["d_ph"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["d_ph"],"person:identifier.orcid":["0000000278707933"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T09:32:40Z"}