{"id":{"repo_id":"birmingham","oai_identifier":"oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:18419"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/birmingham/oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:18419","repository":{"repo_id":"birmingham","name":"University of Birmingham","base_url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"Kant, Schopenhauer and the dance of the seven veils","abstract":"In this thesis, I challenge Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy, and his claim that his own work is a corrected version of Kant’s transcendental idealism. I argue that Schopenhauer misconstrues Kant in several significant ways, and that, by considering why this is the case, an alternative interpretation can be found, allowing a more defensible version of Kant’s conception of moral agency to emerge. I begin by contrasting how each philosopher develops his view of the basis of ethics from what they take to be ordinary human experience, outlining the difference in their approaches to the roles of rationality and the will. Some specific Schopenhauerian criticisms are then examined, in order to demonstrate that, by defending Kant, a way can be found to interpret him, avoiding the difficulties. My construal of Kant’s ‘transcendentalism’ then suggests such a way and reinforces my contention that Schopenhauer does not correct Kant. I then propose a version of moral agency which emanates from Kant’s architechtonic, highlighting the difference between the purposiveness necessary to Kant’s scheme and the purposelessness of Schopenhauer’s, thus concluding my argument that this irreconcilable difference derives from the more fundamental incompatibility of their different conceptions of rationality.","abstract_html":"In this thesis, I challenge Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy, and his claim that his own work is a corrected version of Kant’s transcendental idealism. I argue that Schopenhauer misconstrues Kant in several significant ways, and that, by considering why this is the case, an alternative interpretation can be found, allowing a more defensible version of Kant’s conception of moral agency to emerge. I begin by contrasting how each philosopher develops his view of the basis of ethics from what they take to be ordinary human experience, outlining the difference in their approaches to the roles of rationality and the will. Some specific Schopenhauerian criticisms are then examined, in order to demonstrate that, by defending Kant, a way can be found to interpret him, avoiding the difficulties. My construal of Kant’s ‘transcendentalism’ then suggests such a way and reinforces my contention that Schopenhauer does not correct Kant. I then propose a version of moral agency which emanates from Kant’s architechtonic, highlighting the difference between the purposiveness necessary to Kant’s scheme and the purposelessness of Schopenhauer’s, thus concluding my argument that this irreconcilable difference derives from the more fundamental incompatibility of their different conceptions of rationality.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Wright, Elizabeth Milligan"],"institution":"University of Birmingham","degree_name":"m_ph","degree_level":"m_ph","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1998,"date_issued":"1998","date_published":"1998","updated_at":"2026-11-19T09:33:16Z","subjects":["B Philosophy (General)"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null,"record_url":null,"record_label":null,"record_kind":null,"record_source":null,"download_url":"http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/18419/1/Wright1998MPhil_19995830_18419.pdf","download_label":"Download PDF","download_source":"dc:identifier.uri","access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=uketd_dc&identifier=oai%3Aetheses.bham.ac.uk%3A18419","prefix":"uketd_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["na"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Wright, Elizabeth Milligan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["1998"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1998"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["School of Humanities","Department of Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Birmingham"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/18419/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["m_ph"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["m_ph"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["B Philosophy (General)"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2","label":"Language (ISO 639-2)","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/18419/1/Wright1998MPhil_19995830_18419.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this thesis, I challenge Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy, and his claim that his own work is a corrected version of Kant’s transcendental idealism. I argue that Schopenhauer misconstrues Kant in several significant ways, and that, by considering why this is the case, an alternative interpretation can be found, allowing a more defensible version of Kant’s conception of moral agency to emerge. I begin by contrasting how each philosopher develops his view of the basis of ethics from what they take to be ordinary human experience, outlining the difference in their approaches to the roles of rationality and the will. Some specific Schopenhauerian criticisms are then examined, in order to demonstrate that, by defending Kant, a way can be found to interpret him, avoiding the difficulties. My construal of Kant’s ‘transcendentalism’ then suggests such a way and reinforces my contention that Schopenhauer does not correct Kant. I then propose a version of moral agency which emanates from Kant’s architechtonic, highlighting the difference between the purposiveness necessary to Kant’s scheme and the purposelessness of Schopenhauer’s, thus concluding my argument that this irreconcilable difference derives from the more fundamental incompatibility of their different conceptions of rationality."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["text"]},{"key":"dcterms:accessrights","label":"Dcterms Accessrights","values":["public"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Kant, Schopenhauer and the dance of the seven veils"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.sponsor":["na"],"dc:creator":["Wright, Elizabeth Milligan"],"dc:date":["1998"],"dc:date.issued":["1998"],"dc:description.abstract":["In this thesis, I challenge Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy, and his claim that his own work is a corrected version of Kant’s transcendental idealism. 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