{"id":{"repo_id":"birmingham","oai_identifier":"oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:4114"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/birmingham/oai:etheses.bham.ac.uk:4114","repository":{"repo_id":"birmingham","name":"University of Birmingham","base_url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"The best candidate for an epistemic contextualist response to scepticism: methodological contexualism","abstract":"In this thesis I promote Michael Williams’s methodological contextualism as the best candidate for a contextualist response to scepticism. Often when people talk about contextualist responses to scepticism they think of a particular branch of contextualism, a group of semantic theses. In the first two sections I explain how this semantic contextualist view is thought to amount to a response to scepticism, and consider how well the most popular form – attributor semantic contextualism – fares against a number of objections. I highlight two features of attributor Contextualism as the source of these problems. In sections 3 and 4 I explain the alternative inferential contextualism which Williams offers, and the other features of his methodological contextualism response to scepticism. I show that his view avoids the objections raised against the more popular attributor view because it doesn’t have the two features I highlight as problematic. As it stands, Williams’s methodological view does not offer a complete response to scepticism, but I suggest two additions which can be made to it to remedy this. In section 5 I conclude that Williams’s view, with my suggested addition, offers the best way forward for those wanting to respond to the sceptic in a contextualist manner.","abstract_html":"In this thesis I promote Michael Williams’s methodological contextualism as the best candidate for a contextualist response to scepticism. Often when people talk about contextualist responses to scepticism they think of a particular branch of contextualism, a group of semantic theses. In the first two sections I explain how this semantic contextualist view is thought to amount to a response to scepticism, and consider how well the most popular form – attributor semantic contextualism – fares against a number of objections. I highlight two features of attributor Contextualism as the source of these problems. In sections 3 and 4 I explain the alternative inferential contextualism which Williams offers, and the other features of his methodological contextualism response to scepticism. I show that his view avoids the objections raised against the more popular attributor view because it doesn’t have the two features I highlight as problematic. As it stands, Williams’s methodological view does not offer a complete response to scepticism, but I suggest two additions which can be made to it to remedy this. In section 5 I conclude that Williams’s view, with my suggested addition, offers the best way forward for those wanting to respond to the sceptic in a contextualist manner.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ashton, Natalie Alana"],"institution":"University of Birmingham","degree_name":"m_ph","degree_level":"m_ph","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-07","date_published":"2013-07","updated_at":"2026-11-19T09:27:33Z","subjects":["B Philosophy (General)"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null,"record_url":null,"record_label":null,"record_kind":null,"record_source":null,"download_url":"http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4114/1/Decl_IS_Davis13MRes.pdf","download_label":"Download PDF","download_source":"dc:identifier.uri","access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=uketd_dc&identifier=oai%3Aetheses.bham.ac.uk%3A4114","prefix":"uketd_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["na"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ashton, Natalie Alana"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2013-07-01"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2013-07"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["College of Arts & Law","Department of Philosophy, Theology and Religion"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Birmingham"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4114/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["m_ph"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["m_ph"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["B Philosophy (General)"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2","label":"Language (ISO 639-2)","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4114/1/Decl_IS_Davis13MRes.pdf","http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4114/2/Davis13MRes.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this thesis I promote Michael Williams’s methodological contextualism as the best candidate for a contextualist response to scepticism. 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