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In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.","abstract_html":"We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sen Gupta, Sonali"],"institution":"University of Birmingham","degree_name":"d_ph","degree_level":"d_ph","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-12","date_published":"2014-12","updated_at":"2026-11-19T09:28:08Z","subjects":["HB Economic Theory"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null,"record_url":null,"record_label":null,"record_kind":null,"record_source":null,"download_url":"http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/5/Decl_IS_Gupta14PhD.pdf","download_label":"Download PDF","download_source":"dc:identifier.uri","access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/cgi/oai2?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=uketd_dc&identifier=oai%3Aetheses.bham.ac.uk%3A5102","prefix":"uketd_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["na"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sen Gupta, Sonali"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2014-12"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2014-12"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["College of Social Sciences","Birmingham Business School, Department of Economics"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Birmingham"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["d_ph"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["d_ph"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["HB Economic Theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2","label":"Language (ISO 639-2)","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/5/Decl_IS_Gupta14PhD.pdf","http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/9/Sen_Gupta14PhD.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dcterms:accessrights","label":"Dcterms Accessrights","values":["staffonly","public"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.sponsor":["na"],"dc:creator":["Sen Gupta, Sonali"],"dc:date":["2014-12"],"dc:date.issued":["2014-12"],"dc:description.abstract":["We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/5/Decl_IS_Gupta14PhD.pdf","http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/9/Sen_Gupta14PhD.pdf"],"dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2":["eng"],"dc:publisher.department":["College of Social Sciences","Birmingham Business School, Department of Economics"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Birmingham"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/"],"dc:subject":["HB Economic Theory"],"dcterms:accessrights":["staffonly","public"],"dc:title":["Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["d_ph"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["d_ph"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T09:28:08Z"}