{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/17850"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/17850","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Inverting the void: a comparison of al-Ghazālī and Descartes","abstract":"In this thesis, I compare the intellectual trajectories of René Descartes (c. 1596 – 1650) and Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058 – 1111). In Part I, I begin by considering their initial skeptical phases, where the two thinkers are at their most similar, philosophically, methodologically and narratively. I argue that while they begin their projects almost identically, especially in their methods and course of argument, they nonetheless differ in crucial respects. I locate the principal difference to be in their particular uses of the dream. While al-Ghazālī uses the dream to doubt reason itself, Descartes uses it merely to doubt sense-perception and particulars. I analyze this difference by drawing distinctions between dream consciousness and waking consciousness, local and global states of illusion, and which position in time each thinker argues from. I conclude Part I by showing how, despite arriving at the same formal, global skeptical conclusion, our two philosophers nonetheless arrive at it in characteristically different ways. In Part II, I consider how the two thinkers attempt to defeat skepticism. I pay particular attention to their epistemological, phenomenological and metaphysical claims, and their negotiations between reason, experience and the supra-rational. In virtue of comparing their parallel journeys out of skepticism’s void, I am able to argue that the substantive content of their skeptical phases is integral to their positive conclusions. I show that their positive conclusions are direct inversions of those early skeptical structures. More generally, I argue that skepticism –– to its own demise –– is never empty of content.","abstract_html":"In this thesis, I compare the intellectual trajectories of René Descartes (c. 1596 – 1650) and Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058 – 1111). In Part I, I begin by considering their initial skeptical phases, where the two thinkers are at their most similar, philosophically, methodologically and narratively. I argue that while they begin their projects almost identically, especially in their methods and course of argument, they nonetheless differ in crucial respects. I locate the principal difference to be in their particular uses of the dream. While al-Ghazālī uses the dream to doubt reason itself, Descartes uses it merely to doubt sense-perception and particulars. I analyze this difference by drawing distinctions between dream consciousness and waking consciousness, local and global states of illusion, and which position in time each thinker argues from. I conclude Part I by showing how, despite arriving at the same formal, global skeptical conclusion, our two philosophers nonetheless arrive at it in characteristically different ways. In Part II, I consider how the two thinkers attempt to defeat skepticism. I pay particular attention to their epistemological, phenomenological and metaphysical claims, and their negotiations between reason, experience and the supra-rational. In virtue of comparing their parallel journeys out of skepticism’s void, I am able to argue that the substantive content of their skeptical phases is integral to their positive conclusions. I show that their positive conclusions are direct inversions of those early skeptical structures. More generally, I argue that skepticism –– to its own demise –– is never empty of content.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Khashoggi, Kamal-Edin"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"M.A.","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016","date_published":"2016","updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:18:21Z","subjects":["Philosophy","al-Ghazali","Descartes","Epistemology","Foundationalism","Metaphysics","Skepticism"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/17850","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/17850","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F17850","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Khashoggi, Kamal-Edin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2016-09-07T12:42:59Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-09-07T12:42:59Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2016"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2016-08-12T01:28:46Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.A."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","al-Ghazali","Descartes","Epistemology","Foundationalism","Metaphysics","Skepticism"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/17850"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this thesis, I compare the intellectual trajectories of René Descartes (c. 1596 – 1650) and Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058 – 1111). In Part I, I begin by considering their initial skeptical phases, where the two thinkers are at their most similar, philosophically, methodologically and narratively. I argue that while they begin their projects almost identically, especially in their methods and course of argument, they nonetheless differ in crucial respects. I locate the principal difference to be in their particular uses of the dream. While al-Ghazālī uses the dream to doubt reason itself, Descartes uses it merely to doubt sense-perception and particulars. I analyze this difference by drawing distinctions between dream consciousness and waking consciousness, local and global states of illusion, and which position in time each thinker argues from. I conclude Part I by showing how, despite arriving at the same formal, global skeptical conclusion, our two philosophers nonetheless arrive at it in characteristically different ways. In Part II, I consider how the two thinkers attempt to defeat skepticism. I pay particular attention to their epistemological, phenomenological and metaphysical claims, and their negotiations between reason, experience and the supra-rational. In virtue of comparing their parallel journeys out of skepticism’s void, I am able to argue that the substantive content of their skeptical phases is integral to their positive conclusions. I show that their positive conclusions are direct inversions of those early skeptical structures. More generally, I argue that skepticism –– to its own demise –– is never empty of content."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Inverting the void: a comparison of al-Ghazālī and Descartes"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Khashoggi, Kamal-Edin"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2016-09-07T12:42:59Z"],"dc:date.available":["2016-09-07T12:42:59Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2016"],"dc:date.updated":["2016-08-12T01:28:46Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["In this thesis, I compare the intellectual trajectories of René Descartes (c. 1596 – 1650) and Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058 – 1111). In Part I, I begin by considering their initial skeptical phases, where the two thinkers are at their most similar, philosophically, methodologically and narratively. I argue that while they begin their projects almost identically, especially in their methods and course of argument, they nonetheless differ in crucial respects. I locate the principal difference to be in their particular uses of the dream. While al-Ghazālī uses the dream to doubt reason itself, Descartes uses it merely to doubt sense-perception and particulars. I analyze this difference by drawing distinctions between dream consciousness and waking consciousness, local and global states of illusion, and which position in time each thinker argues from. I conclude Part I by showing how, despite arriving at the same formal, global skeptical conclusion, our two philosophers nonetheless arrive at it in characteristically different ways. In Part II, I consider how the two thinkers attempt to defeat skepticism. I pay particular attention to their epistemological, phenomenological and metaphysical claims, and their negotiations between reason, experience and the supra-rational. In virtue of comparing their parallel journeys out of skepticism’s void, I am able to argue that the substantive content of their skeptical phases is integral to their positive conclusions. I show that their positive conclusions are direct inversions of those early skeptical structures. More generally, I argue that skepticism –– to its own demise –– is never empty of content."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/17850"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy","al-Ghazali","Descartes","Epistemology","Foundationalism","Metaphysics","Skepticism"],"dc:title":["Inverting the void: a comparison of al-Ghazālī and Descartes"],"dc:type":["Thesis/Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.A."],"thesis:institution_name":["Boston University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:18:21Z"}