{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/29643"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/29643","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The ethical theory of William James","abstract":"The problem for this thesis is primarily to determine if an ethical theory can be constructed for William James and, incidentally, to determine what relationship it bears to the rest of his philosophy. If the ethical theory is to be constructed, it must give some account for the place of reason in ethical decisions as well as some account of basic ethical principles. It is essential to deal with the problem of the place of reason in James's ethical theory before presenting the basic principles of his ethical theory because the solution of it makes the argument for the basic principles meaningful. James arrives at the conclusion that reason is limited. In criticizing the contrary position, which he calls intellectualism, James says that there are two epistemological maxims: know truth and avoid error. The latter, if strictly obeyed, might tend to turn one away from the truth needlessly, when it is within his grasp. James's final criticism of intellectualism is that it relies for its own foundation upon something more than reason. Intellectualism can only be asserted on the grounds of faith or volitional nature. Scepticism is criticized in the same manner by James. Scepticism is merely one act of the volitional nature laying down the law over all other acts of the volitional nature and saying that they are improper. Finally, James must exercise his own volitional nature in going beyond reason [TRUNCATED]","abstract_html":"The problem for this thesis is primarily to determine if an ethical theory can be constructed for William James and, incidentally, to determine what relationship it bears to the rest of his philosophy. If the ethical theory is to be constructed, it must give some account for the place of reason in ethical decisions as well as some account of basic ethical principles. It is essential to deal with the problem of the place of reason in James&#x27;s ethical theory before presenting the basic principles of his ethical theory because the solution of it makes the argument for the basic principles meaningful. James arrives at the conclusion that reason is limited. In criticizing the contrary position, which he calls intellectualism, James says that there are two epistemological maxims: know truth and avoid error. The latter, if strictly obeyed, might tend to turn one away from the truth needlessly, when it is within his grasp. James&#x27;s final criticism of intellectualism is that it relies for its own foundation upon something more than reason. Intellectualism can only be asserted on the grounds of faith or volitional nature. Scepticism is criticized in the same manner by James. Scepticism is merely one act of the volitional nature laying down the law over all other acts of the volitional nature and saying that they are improper. Finally, James must exercise his own volitional nature in going beyond reason [TRUNCATED]","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Enteman, Willard F."],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1962,"date_issued":"1962","date_published":"1962","updated_at":"2026-11-19T02:40:14Z","subjects":["Ethics","James, William"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":["Based on investigation of the BU Libraries' staff, this work is free of known copyright restrictions."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.barcode","label":"Dc Identifier Barcode","values":["11719017848005"],"render_values":[{"text":"11719017848005","href":null,"code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.bibid","label":"Dc Identifier Bibid","values":["99191410920001161"],"render_values":[{"text":"99191410920001161","href":null,"code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["b14565389"],"render_values":[{"text":"b14565389","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/29643","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/29643","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F29643","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Enteman, Willard F."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2018-06-26T15:55:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2018-06-26T15:55:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1962"]},{"key":"dc:date.submitted","label":"Dc Date Submitted","values":["1962"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Boston University"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Ethics","James, William"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Based on investigation of the BU Libraries' staff, this work is free of known copyright restrictions."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.barcode","label":"Dc Identifier Barcode","values":["11719017848005"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.bibid","label":"Dc Identifier Bibid","values":["99191410920001161"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["b14565389"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/29643"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The problem for this thesis is primarily to determine if an ethical theory can be constructed for William James and, incidentally, to determine what relationship it bears to the rest of his philosophy. If the ethical theory is to be constructed, it must give some account for the place of reason in ethical decisions as well as some account of basic ethical principles. It is essential to deal with the problem of the place of reason in James's ethical theory before presenting the basic principles of his ethical theory because the solution of it makes the argument for the basic principles meaningful. James arrives at the conclusion that reason is limited. In criticizing the contrary position, which he calls intellectualism, James says that there are two epistemological maxims: know truth and avoid error. The latter, if strictly obeyed, might tend to turn one away from the truth needlessly, when it is within his grasp. James's final criticism of intellectualism is that it relies for its own foundation upon something more than reason. Intellectualism can only be asserted on the grounds of faith or volitional nature. Scepticism is criticized in the same manner by James. Scepticism is merely one act of the volitional nature laying down the law over all other acts of the volitional nature and saying that they are improper. Finally, James must exercise his own volitional nature in going beyond reason [TRUNCATED]"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The ethical theory of William James"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Enteman, Willard F."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2018-06-26T15:55:53Z"],"dc:date.available":["2018-06-26T15:55:53Z"],"dc:date.issued":["1962"],"dc:date.submitted":["1962"],"dc:description":["Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University"],"dc:description.abstract":["The problem for this thesis is primarily to determine if an ethical theory can be constructed for William James and, incidentally, to determine what relationship it bears to the rest of his philosophy. If the ethical theory is to be constructed, it must give some account for the place of reason in ethical decisions as well as some account of basic ethical principles. It is essential to deal with the problem of the place of reason in James's ethical theory before presenting the basic principles of his ethical theory because the solution of it makes the argument for the basic principles meaningful. James arrives at the conclusion that reason is limited. In criticizing the contrary position, which he calls intellectualism, James says that there are two epistemological maxims: know truth and avoid error. The latter, if strictly obeyed, might tend to turn one away from the truth needlessly, when it is within his grasp. James's final criticism of intellectualism is that it relies for its own foundation upon something more than reason. Intellectualism can only be asserted on the grounds of faith or volitional nature. Scepticism is criticized in the same manner by James. Scepticism is merely one act of the volitional nature laying down the law over all other acts of the volitional nature and saying that they are improper. Finally, James must exercise his own volitional nature in going beyond reason [TRUNCATED]"],"dc:identifier.barcode":["11719017848005"],"dc:identifier.bibid":["99191410920001161"],"dc:identifier.other":["b14565389"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/29643"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:publisher":["Boston University"],"dc:rights":["Based on investigation of the BU Libraries' staff, this work is free of known copyright restrictions."],"dc:subject":["Ethics","James, William"],"dc:title":["The ethical theory of William James"],"dc:type":["Thesis/Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["Boston University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T02:40:14Z"}