{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/41999"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/41999","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Growing pains: the family in the era of technology","abstract":"The philosophical aim of this dissertation is to determine the best social arrangements for bearing and rearing children in the context of emerging reproductive technologies. A novel feature of my account is that it follows the form of a thought-experiment—imagining a world where artificial womb technology offers a nonphysical alternative to pregnancy. In chapter one, I consider whether gestational motherhood ought to be abolished and replaced with a state-run institution of artificial wombs. While the latter arrangement would admittedly promote equality of opportunity among fetuses, I argue that it conflicts with the fundamental rights of gestational mothers. In chapter two, I consider whether the state should impose licensing regulations on parents and procreators to ensure children are provided adequate care. I offer a series of objections to licensing by challenging the analogical argument between parents and professionals, as well as the assumption that parents’ incompetence is responsible for the harms done to children. I then defend a less invasive alternative to licensing, suggesting that the focus of reform should be on ensuring adults acquire obligations to provide childcare voluntarily. However, limited reproductive options pose a problem insofar as a woman who finds herself unintentionally pregnant may have no choice but to continue providing gestational care. Thus, in chapter three, I argue that artificial wombs ought to be a widely-available reproductive option such that women can opt-out of pregnancy. On my account, childbearing should be performed by willing mothers, and childrearing should be performed by willing parents. In chapter four, I shift focus to determine what children are morally owed. More specifically, I defend a new interpretation of the child’s right to an open future that pays special attention to the challenges of parenting in a morally imperfect world.","abstract_html":"The philosophical aim of this dissertation is to determine the best social arrangements for bearing and rearing children in the context of emerging reproductive technologies. A novel feature of my account is that it follows the form of a thought-experiment—imagining a world where artificial womb technology offers a nonphysical alternative to pregnancy. In chapter one, I consider whether gestational motherhood ought to be abolished and replaced with a state-run institution of artificial wombs. While the latter arrangement would admittedly promote equality of opportunity among fetuses, I argue that it conflicts with the fundamental rights of gestational mothers. In chapter two, I consider whether the state should impose licensing regulations on parents and procreators to ensure children are provided adequate care. I offer a series of objections to licensing by challenging the analogical argument between parents and professionals, as well as the assumption that parents’ incompetence is responsible for the harms done to children. I then defend a less invasive alternative to licensing, suggesting that the focus of reform should be on ensuring adults acquire obligations to provide childcare voluntarily. However, limited reproductive options pose a problem insofar as a woman who finds herself unintentionally pregnant may have no choice but to continue providing gestational care. Thus, in chapter three, I argue that artificial wombs ought to be a widely-available reproductive option such that women can opt-out of pregnancy. On my account, childbearing should be performed by willing mothers, and childrearing should be performed by willing parents. In chapter four, I shift focus to determine what children are morally owed. More specifically, I defend a new interpretation of the child’s right to an open future that pays special attention to the challenges of parenting in a morally imperfect world.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kennedy, Susan"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Star, Daniel"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020","date_published":"2020","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:41:18Z","subjects":["Philosophy","Ectogenesis","Gestation","Parenthood","Pregnancy","Procreation"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000-0001-8234-5448"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0001-8234-5448","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8234-5448","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/41999","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/41999","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F41999","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Star, Daniel"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kennedy, Susan"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000-0001-8234-5448"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2021-02-08T15:28:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2021-02-08T15:28:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2020"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2021-02-07T23:01:41Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","Ectogenesis","Gestation","Parenthood","Pregnancy","Procreation"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/41999"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The philosophical aim of this dissertation is to determine the best social arrangements for bearing and rearing children in the context of emerging reproductive technologies. A novel feature of my account is that it follows the form of a thought-experiment—imagining a world where artificial womb technology offers a nonphysical alternative to pregnancy. In chapter one, I consider whether gestational motherhood ought to be abolished and replaced with a state-run institution of artificial wombs. While the latter arrangement would admittedly promote equality of opportunity among fetuses, I argue that it conflicts with the fundamental rights of gestational mothers. In chapter two, I consider whether the state should impose licensing regulations on parents and procreators to ensure children are provided adequate care. I offer a series of objections to licensing by challenging the analogical argument between parents and professionals, as well as the assumption that parents’ incompetence is responsible for the harms done to children. I then defend a less invasive alternative to licensing, suggesting that the focus of reform should be on ensuring adults acquire obligations to provide childcare voluntarily. However, limited reproductive options pose a problem insofar as a woman who finds herself unintentionally pregnant may have no choice but to continue providing gestational care. Thus, in chapter three, I argue that artificial wombs ought to be a widely-available reproductive option such that women can opt-out of pregnancy. On my account, childbearing should be performed by willing mothers, and childrearing should be performed by willing parents. In chapter four, I shift focus to determine what children are morally owed. More specifically, I defend a new interpretation of the child’s right to an open future that pays special attention to the challenges of parenting in a morally imperfect world."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Growing pains: the family in the era of technology"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Star, Daniel"],"dc:creator":["Kennedy, Susan"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2021-02-08T15:28:35Z"],"dc:date.available":["2021-02-08T15:28:35Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2020"],"dc:date.updated":["2021-02-07T23:01:41Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["The philosophical aim of this dissertation is to determine the best social arrangements for bearing and rearing children in the context of emerging reproductive technologies. A novel feature of my account is that it follows the form of a thought-experiment—imagining a world where artificial womb technology offers a nonphysical alternative to pregnancy. In chapter one, I consider whether gestational motherhood ought to be abolished and replaced with a state-run institution of artificial wombs. While the latter arrangement would admittedly promote equality of opportunity among fetuses, I argue that it conflicts with the fundamental rights of gestational mothers. In chapter two, I consider whether the state should impose licensing regulations on parents and procreators to ensure children are provided adequate care. I offer a series of objections to licensing by challenging the analogical argument between parents and professionals, as well as the assumption that parents’ incompetence is responsible for the harms done to children. I then defend a less invasive alternative to licensing, suggesting that the focus of reform should be on ensuring adults acquire obligations to provide childcare voluntarily. However, limited reproductive options pose a problem insofar as a woman who finds herself unintentionally pregnant may have no choice but to continue providing gestational care. Thus, in chapter three, I argue that artificial wombs ought to be a widely-available reproductive option such that women can opt-out of pregnancy. On my account, childbearing should be performed by willing mothers, and childrearing should be performed by willing parents. In chapter four, I shift focus to determine what children are morally owed. 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