{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/43115"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/43115","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Board meetings and the information gap between managers and independent directors","abstract":"This study examines board meetings’ role in reducing the information gap between managers and independent directors. Using abnormal returns to insider trades as a proxy for insiders’ information level, I find no association between board meetings and the manager-director information gap for the pre-2003 period. However, in the post-2003 period, board meetings significantly increase directors’ information level relative to that of managers. I next identify that board meetings’ informational role is driven by the 2003 NASDAQ and NYSE board independence requirements. Further analyses support a causal link between board meetings and the smaller manager-director information gap post-2003. Furthermore, board meetings’ information role is more pronounced for directors who are relatively new to the firm, diverse directors, directors with outside connections, and directors sitting on certain committees. Lastly, using a subsample of firms that voluntarily disclose disaggregated information on board meetings, I find that the form of board meetings also matters: in-person board meetings reduce the manager-director information gap, while remote board meetings do not. Overall, board meetings’ informational efficacy depends on mandatory board independence, independent directors’ characteristics, and board meetings’ organizational forms.","abstract_html":"This study examines board meetings’ role in reducing the information gap between managers and independent directors. Using abnormal returns to insider trades as a proxy for insiders’ information level, I find no association between board meetings and the manager-director information gap for the pre-2003 period. However, in the post-2003 period, board meetings significantly increase directors’ information level relative to that of managers. I next identify that board meetings’ informational role is driven by the 2003 NASDAQ and NYSE board independence requirements. Further analyses support a causal link between board meetings and the smaller manager-director information gap post-2003. Furthermore, board meetings’ information role is more pronounced for directors who are relatively new to the firm, diverse directors, directors with outside connections, and directors sitting on certain committees. Lastly, using a subsample of firms that voluntarily disclose disaggregated information on board meetings, I find that the form of board meetings also matters: in-person board meetings reduce the manager-director information gap, while remote board meetings do not. Overall, board meetings’ informational efficacy depends on mandatory board independence, independent directors’ characteristics, and board meetings’ organizational forms.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Jiang, Yijing"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Management","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Brochet, Francois"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021","date_published":"2021","updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:33:52Z","subjects":["Accounting","Board meetings","Corporate governance","Independent directors","Information asymmetry","Insider trading"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000-0003-0549-0021"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0003-0549-0021","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0549-0021","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/43115","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/43115","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F43115","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Brochet, Francois"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Jiang, Yijing"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000-0003-0549-0021"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2021-10-06T15:08:31Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2021-10-06T15:08:31Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2021"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2021-09-27T16:05:14Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Management"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Accounting","Board meetings","Corporate governance","Independent directors","Information asymmetry","Insider trading"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/43115"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This study examines board meetings’ role in reducing the information gap between managers and independent directors. Using abnormal returns to insider trades as a proxy for insiders’ information level, I find no association between board meetings and the manager-director information gap for the pre-2003 period. However, in the post-2003 period, board meetings significantly increase directors’ information level relative to that of managers. I next identify that board meetings’ informational role is driven by the 2003 NASDAQ and NYSE board independence requirements. Further analyses support a causal link between board meetings and the smaller manager-director information gap post-2003. Furthermore, board meetings’ information role is more pronounced for directors who are relatively new to the firm, diverse directors, directors with outside connections, and directors sitting on certain committees. Lastly, using a subsample of firms that voluntarily disclose disaggregated information on board meetings, I find that the form of board meetings also matters: in-person board meetings reduce the manager-director information gap, while remote board meetings do not. Overall, board meetings’ informational efficacy depends on mandatory board independence, independent directors’ characteristics, and board meetings’ organizational forms."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Board meetings and the information gap between managers and independent directors"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Brochet, Francois"],"dc:creator":["Jiang, Yijing"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2021-10-06T15:08:31Z"],"dc:date.available":["2021-10-06T15:08:31Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2021"],"dc:date.updated":["2021-09-27T16:05:14Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This study examines board meetings’ role in reducing the information gap between managers and independent directors. Using abnormal returns to insider trades as a proxy for insiders’ information level, I find no association between board meetings and the manager-director information gap for the pre-2003 period. However, in the post-2003 period, board meetings significantly increase directors’ information level relative to that of managers. I next identify that board meetings’ informational role is driven by the 2003 NASDAQ and NYSE board independence requirements. Further analyses support a causal link between board meetings and the smaller manager-director information gap post-2003. Furthermore, board meetings’ information role is more pronounced for directors who are relatively new to the firm, diverse directors, directors with outside connections, and directors sitting on certain committees. 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