{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/49665"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/49665","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Examining cognitive expertise as a type of expertise and a requirement for moral expertise","abstract":"Cognitive expertise is generally described as expertise that comes from propositional knowledge. It stands in contrast to performative expertise, which consists of skillfully doing actions in a particular domain D; analytic expertise, which involves identifying the domain-specific norms that guide a judgment in D; and communicative expertise, which comes from regularly communicating about D. The first two chapters of this dissertation offer solutions to two unresolved issues in the cognitive expertise literature: the correct definition of cognitive expertise and the novice/two expert problem. In Chapter 1, I argue that cognitive expertise in some domain D is defined as having at time t: (1) more evidence about propositions in D than most people; (2) a superior ability to reason based on that evidence; and (3) reliable beliefs and judgments about D because of that evidence and ability. The novice/two expert problem occurs when a cognitive novice must choose between two putative cognitive experts’ opposing judgments but can’t make a justified choice because of her novice status. Alvin Goldman offers five sources of evidence that a cognitive novice can rely on to solve her problem. Since Goldman’s sources will often be difficult for a cognitive novice to access, understand, and/or assess, I offer a new, generally applicable solution to the problem: a lesser cognitive expert, i.e., someone who has more cognitive expertise in the relevant domain than a cognitive novice but less than people who have complete cognitive expertise in it. I argue a cognitive novice can make a justified choice by relying on a lesser cognitive expert whom she knows personally and who is her general epistemic peer. The final two chapters concern expertise in a particular domain: morality. In Chapter 3, I argue that cognitive expertise is the only type of expertise required for moral expertise. In Chapter 4, I take the position that while complete moral expertise is currently impossible, lesser moral expertise is possible. I argue that to understand moral expertise, we need to focus on non-philosophers as lesser moral experts. To that end, I offer methods for identifying lesser moral experts and subdomains of moral expertise.","abstract_html":"Cognitive expertise is generally described as expertise that comes from propositional knowledge. It stands in contrast to performative expertise, which consists of skillfully doing actions in a particular domain D; analytic expertise, which involves identifying the domain-specific norms that guide a judgment in D; and communicative expertise, which comes from regularly communicating about D. The first two chapters of this dissertation offer solutions to two unresolved issues in the cognitive expertise literature: the correct definition of cognitive expertise and the novice/two expert problem. In Chapter 1, I argue that cognitive expertise in some domain D is defined as having at time t: (1) more evidence about propositions in D than most people; (2) a superior ability to reason based on that evidence; and (3) reliable beliefs and judgments about D because of that evidence and ability. The novice/two expert problem occurs when a cognitive novice must choose between two putative cognitive experts’ opposing judgments but can’t make a justified choice because of her novice status. Alvin Goldman offers five sources of evidence that a cognitive novice can rely on to solve her problem. Since Goldman’s sources will often be difficult for a cognitive novice to access, understand, and/or assess, I offer a new, generally applicable solution to the problem: a lesser cognitive expert, i.e., someone who has more cognitive expertise in the relevant domain than a cognitive novice but less than people who have complete cognitive expertise in it. I argue a cognitive novice can make a justified choice by relying on a lesser cognitive expert whom she knows personally and who is her general epistemic peer. The final two chapters concern expertise in a particular domain: morality. In Chapter 3, I argue that cognitive expertise is the only type of expertise required for moral expertise. In Chapter 4, I take the position that while complete moral expertise is currently impossible, lesser moral expertise is possible. I argue that to understand moral expertise, we need to focus on non-philosophers as lesser moral experts. To that end, I offer methods for identifying lesser moral experts and subdomains of moral expertise.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Medeiros, Mallory"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Star, Daniel"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023","date_published":"2023","updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:30:23Z","subjects":["Philosophy","Cognitive","Expertise","Experts","Moral","Novice","Performative"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":["Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International"],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/49665","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/49665","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F49665","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Star, Daniel"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Medeiros, Mallory"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2025-01-30T16:06:18Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2025-01-30T16:06:18Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2023"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2025-01-29T23:02:08Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","Cognitive","Expertise","Experts","Moral","Novice","Performative"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/49665"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["2023"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Cognitive expertise is generally described as expertise that comes from propositional knowledge. It stands in contrast to performative expertise, which consists of skillfully doing actions in a particular domain D; analytic expertise, which involves identifying the domain-specific norms that guide a judgment in D; and communicative expertise, which comes from regularly communicating about D. The first two chapters of this dissertation offer solutions to two unresolved issues in the cognitive expertise literature: the correct definition of cognitive expertise and the novice/two expert problem. In Chapter 1, I argue that cognitive expertise in some domain D is defined as having at time t: (1) more evidence about propositions in D than most people; (2) a superior ability to reason based on that evidence; and (3) reliable beliefs and judgments about D because of that evidence and ability. The novice/two expert problem occurs when a cognitive novice must choose between two putative cognitive experts’ opposing judgments but can’t make a justified choice because of her novice status. Alvin Goldman offers five sources of evidence that a cognitive novice can rely on to solve her problem. Since Goldman’s sources will often be difficult for a cognitive novice to access, understand, and/or assess, I offer a new, generally applicable solution to the problem: a lesser cognitive expert, i.e., someone who has more cognitive expertise in the relevant domain than a cognitive novice but less than people who have complete cognitive expertise in it. I argue a cognitive novice can make a justified choice by relying on a lesser cognitive expert whom she knows personally and who is her general epistemic peer. The final two chapters concern expertise in a particular domain: morality. In Chapter 3, I argue that cognitive expertise is the only type of expertise required for moral expertise. In Chapter 4, I take the position that while complete moral expertise is currently impossible, lesser moral expertise is possible. I argue that to understand moral expertise, we need to focus on non-philosophers as lesser moral experts. To that end, I offer methods for identifying lesser moral experts and subdomains of moral expertise."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Examining cognitive expertise as a type of expertise and a requirement for moral expertise"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Star, Daniel"],"dc:creator":["Medeiros, Mallory"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2025-01-30T16:06:18Z"],"dc:date.available":["2025-01-30T16:06:18Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2023"],"dc:date.updated":["2025-01-29T23:02:08Z"],"dc:description":["2023"],"dc:description.abstract":["Cognitive expertise is generally described as expertise that comes from propositional knowledge. It stands in contrast to performative expertise, which consists of skillfully doing actions in a particular domain D; analytic expertise, which involves identifying the domain-specific norms that guide a judgment in D; and communicative expertise, which comes from regularly communicating about D. The first two chapters of this dissertation offer solutions to two unresolved issues in the cognitive expertise literature: the correct definition of cognitive expertise and the novice/two expert problem. In Chapter 1, I argue that cognitive expertise in some domain D is defined as having at time t: (1) more evidence about propositions in D than most people; (2) a superior ability to reason based on that evidence; and (3) reliable beliefs and judgments about D because of that evidence and ability. The novice/two expert problem occurs when a cognitive novice must choose between two putative cognitive experts’ opposing judgments but can’t make a justified choice because of her novice status. Alvin Goldman offers five sources of evidence that a cognitive novice can rely on to solve her problem. Since Goldman’s sources will often be difficult for a cognitive novice to access, understand, and/or assess, I offer a new, generally applicable solution to the problem: a lesser cognitive expert, i.e., someone who has more cognitive expertise in the relevant domain than a cognitive novice but less than people who have complete cognitive expertise in it. I argue a cognitive novice can make a justified choice by relying on a lesser cognitive expert whom she knows personally and who is her general epistemic peer. The final two chapters concern expertise in a particular domain: morality. In Chapter 3, I argue that cognitive expertise is the only type of expertise required for moral expertise. In Chapter 4, I take the position that while complete moral expertise is currently impossible, lesser moral expertise is possible. I argue that to understand moral expertise, we need to focus on non-philosophers as lesser moral experts. To that end, I offer methods for identifying lesser moral experts and subdomains of moral expertise."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/49665"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:rights":["Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy","Cognitive","Expertise","Experts","Moral","Novice","Performative"],"dc:title":["Examining cognitive expertise as a type of expertise and a requirement for moral expertise"],"dc:type":["Thesis/Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["Boston University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:30:23Z"}