{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53292"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53292","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Discretion in policymaking and bureaucratic oversight under weak institutions: evidence from contemporary China","abstract":"Through three interconnected articles, this dissertation examines the determinants and consequences of policymaking discretion in hierarchical bureaucracies. Bureaucratic oversight involves centralized control to hold lower-level agents accountable, while effective policy implementation often requires downward delegation of discretion, which can however be misused by lower-level agents for their personal gains. Through the lens of local rule-making activities in contemporary Chinese bureaucracy, I explore how the Chinese state strategically navigates the tension between delegation and centralization within its vast administrative hierarchy. Analyzing a novel textual dataset of 319,000 Chinese local regulatory documents, my first article examines the “rule-discretion trade-off” in a centralized bureaucracy without institutionalized oversight mechanisms. Focusing on “rule-drafting cost” due to information asymmetry and lack of capacity to stipulate policy details, this paper identifies the conditions under which policymakers adopt more written ex ante rules to monitor agents, or delegate discretion to them for carrying out policies. I use difference-in-difference to exploit an administrative reform with exogenous variations in rule-drafting costs across different policy domains. I find that rising drafting costs decrease the use of ex ante rules but increase discretion delegation, however shifting to ex post oversight over performance targets as a compensation. Furthermore, my second article focuses on 158,000 provincial-rank regulatory documents, and provides a thorough descriptive analysis of how discretion delegation and contingent-rule constraints are designed and allocated in the local regulatory rules created by Chinese provincial governments. The analysis reveals that both delegation and constraints intensified over time, but wealthier provinces exhibited stronger centralization in micro-level policy design, potentially due to their stronger capacity. While delegation and centralization often substitute for one another across policy domains, this trade-off is less pronounced in economically advanced regions. My third article turns to the consequences of bureaucratic discretion. Using a difference-in-differences design and rich administrative data on civil service recruitment, I examine China’s 2016 VAT reform and show that increased regulatory discretionary authority in tax bureaus attracted more higher-quality bureaucrat candidates, particularly in regions with greater expansions of discretion in taxation and potential for theft in public sectors.","abstract_html":"Through three interconnected articles, this dissertation examines the determinants and consequences of policymaking discretion in hierarchical bureaucracies. Bureaucratic oversight involves centralized control to hold lower-level agents accountable, while effective policy implementation often requires downward delegation of discretion, which can however be misused by lower-level agents for their personal gains. Through the lens of local rule-making activities in contemporary Chinese bureaucracy, I explore how the Chinese state strategically navigates the tension between delegation and centralization within its vast administrative hierarchy. Analyzing a novel textual dataset of 319,000 Chinese local regulatory documents, my first article examines the “rule-discretion trade-off” in a centralized bureaucracy without institutionalized oversight mechanisms. Focusing on “rule-drafting cost” due to information asymmetry and lack of capacity to stipulate policy details, this paper identifies the conditions under which policymakers adopt more written ex ante rules to monitor agents, or delegate discretion to them for carrying out policies. I use difference-in-difference to exploit an administrative reform with exogenous variations in rule-drafting costs across different policy domains. I find that rising drafting costs decrease the use of ex ante rules but increase discretion delegation, however shifting to ex post oversight over performance targets as a compensation. Furthermore, my second article focuses on 158,000 provincial-rank regulatory documents, and provides a thorough descriptive analysis of how discretion delegation and contingent-rule constraints are designed and allocated in the local regulatory rules created by Chinese provincial governments. The analysis reveals that both delegation and constraints intensified over time, but wealthier provinces exhibited stronger centralization in micro-level policy design, potentially due to their stronger capacity. While delegation and centralization often substitute for one another across policy domains, this trade-off is less pronounced in economically advanced regions. My third article turns to the consequences of bureaucratic discretion. Using a difference-in-differences design and rich administrative data on civil service recruitment, I examine China’s 2016 VAT reform and show that increased regulatory discretionary authority in tax bureaus attracted more higher-quality bureaucrat candidates, particularly in regions with greater expansions of discretion in taxation and potential for theft in public sectors.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Feng, Bo"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Fewsmith, Joseph"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025","date_published":"2025","updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:19:50Z","subjects":["Political science","Bureaucracy","Bureaucratic oversight","China","Delegation","Discretionary authority","Rule-making"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":["Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International"],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53292","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53292","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F53292","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Fewsmith, Joseph"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Feng, Bo"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-07-10T18:30:07Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-07-10T18:30:07Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2026-07-09T19:15:44Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Political science","Bureaucracy","Bureaucratic oversight","China","Delegation","Discretionary authority","Rule-making"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53292"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["2025"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Through three interconnected articles, this dissertation examines the determinants and consequences of policymaking discretion in hierarchical bureaucracies. Bureaucratic oversight involves centralized control to hold lower-level agents accountable, while effective policy implementation often requires downward delegation of discretion, which can however be misused by lower-level agents for their personal gains. Through the lens of local rule-making activities in contemporary Chinese bureaucracy, I explore how the Chinese state strategically navigates the tension between delegation and centralization within its vast administrative hierarchy. Analyzing a novel textual dataset of 319,000 Chinese local regulatory documents, my first article examines the “rule-discretion trade-off” in a centralized bureaucracy without institutionalized oversight mechanisms. Focusing on “rule-drafting cost” due to information asymmetry and lack of capacity to stipulate policy details, this paper identifies the conditions under which policymakers adopt more written ex ante rules to monitor agents, or delegate discretion to them for carrying out policies. I use difference-in-difference to exploit an administrative reform with exogenous variations in rule-drafting costs across different policy domains. I find that rising drafting costs decrease the use of ex ante rules but increase discretion delegation, however shifting to ex post oversight over performance targets as a compensation. Furthermore, my second article focuses on 158,000 provincial-rank regulatory documents, and provides a thorough descriptive analysis of how discretion delegation and contingent-rule constraints are designed and allocated in the local regulatory rules created by Chinese provincial governments. The analysis reveals that both delegation and constraints intensified over time, but wealthier provinces exhibited stronger centralization in micro-level policy design, potentially due to their stronger capacity. While delegation and centralization often substitute for one another across policy domains, this trade-off is less pronounced in economically advanced regions. My third article turns to the consequences of bureaucratic discretion. Using a difference-in-differences design and rich administrative data on civil service recruitment, I examine China’s 2016 VAT reform and show that increased regulatory discretionary authority in tax bureaus attracted more higher-quality bureaucrat candidates, particularly in regions with greater expansions of discretion in taxation and potential for theft in public sectors."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Discretion in policymaking and bureaucratic oversight under weak institutions: evidence from contemporary China"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Fewsmith, Joseph"],"dc:creator":["Feng, Bo"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-07-10T18:30:07Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-07-10T18:30:07Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2025"],"dc:date.updated":["2026-07-09T19:15:44Z"],"dc:description":["2025"],"dc:description.abstract":["Through three interconnected articles, this dissertation examines the determinants and consequences of policymaking discretion in hierarchical bureaucracies. 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I use difference-in-difference to exploit an administrative reform with exogenous variations in rule-drafting costs across different policy domains. I find that rising drafting costs decrease the use of ex ante rules but increase discretion delegation, however shifting to ex post oversight over performance targets as a compensation. Furthermore, my second article focuses on 158,000 provincial-rank regulatory documents, and provides a thorough descriptive analysis of how discretion delegation and contingent-rule constraints are designed and allocated in the local regulatory rules created by Chinese provincial governments. The analysis reveals that both delegation and constraints intensified over time, but wealthier provinces exhibited stronger centralization in micro-level policy design, potentially due to their stronger capacity. While delegation and centralization often substitute for one another across policy domains, this trade-off is less pronounced in economically advanced regions. My third article turns to the consequences of bureaucratic discretion. Using a difference-in-differences design and rich administrative data on civil service recruitment, I examine China’s 2016 VAT reform and show that increased regulatory discretionary authority in tax bureaus attracted more higher-quality bureaucrat candidates, particularly in regions with greater expansions of discretion in taxation and potential for theft in public sectors."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53292"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:rights":["Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"],"dc:subject":["Political science","Bureaucracy","Bureaucratic oversight","China","Delegation","Discretionary authority","Rule-making"],"dc:title":["Discretion in policymaking and bureaucratic oversight under weak institutions: evidence from contemporary China"],"dc:type":["Thesis/Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Political Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["Boston University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:19:50Z"}