{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53393"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53393","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Essays on decision theory","abstract":"This dissertation explores the mechanisms of belief formation and updating, focusing on cognitive dissonance, overprecision, and belief aggregation. Each chapter develops a theoretical model that sheds light on behavioral patterns observed in decision-making under uncertainty. Chapter 1 introduces an intrapersonal game where a decision-maker distorts her beliefs to mitigate cognitive dissonance from past choices. Two selves make sequential decisions, with belief manipulation occurring between them. I characterize the equilibria through axioms on observable choices, enabling parameter identification from choice data. The model explains path dependence in decision-making and provides insights into behavioral phenomena such as add-on selling, poverty traps, and information avoidance. Chapter 2 examines Commutativity, a normative criterion in belief aggregation stating that the aggregation of expert posteriors should be identical to updating aggregated priors. I propose thought experiments that challenge its normative appeal and motivate its relaxations. Under suitable conditions, I establish equivalences between these relaxations and classic axioms for decision-making under uncertainty, including Independence, C-Independence, and Ambiguity Aversion. I further show that a weakening of Commutativity characterizes an aggregation rule emerging from a strategic interaction between “dual-selves,” Pessimism and Optimism. Chapter 3 characterizes an overprecise updating model, where an agent systematically overestimates the informativeness of their posterior beliefs. This framework captures an intrapersonal trade-off between mitigating risk and avoiding distorted posteriors. I establish a connection between laboratory evidence and the psychological mechanism driving uncertainty reduction, showing that overprecision contributes to biases such as overinference, confirmation bias, and overoptimism. When facing contradictory signals, an overprecise agent initially updates too slowly before shifting to overly rapid belief revision. Collectively, these chapters contribute to understanding how individuals process information and update beliefs from both normative and positive perspectives, offering insights into the rational foundations and behavioral deviations in belief formation.","abstract_html":"This dissertation explores the mechanisms of belief formation and updating, focusing on cognitive dissonance, overprecision, and belief aggregation. Each chapter develops a theoretical model that sheds light on behavioral patterns observed in decision-making under uncertainty. Chapter 1 introduces an intrapersonal game where a decision-maker distorts her beliefs to mitigate cognitive dissonance from past choices. Two selves make sequential decisions, with belief manipulation occurring between them. I characterize the equilibria through axioms on observable choices, enabling parameter identification from choice data. The model explains path dependence in decision-making and provides insights into behavioral phenomena such as add-on selling, poverty traps, and information avoidance. Chapter 2 examines Commutativity, a normative criterion in belief aggregation stating that the aggregation of expert posteriors should be identical to updating aggregated priors. I propose thought experiments that challenge its normative appeal and motivate its relaxations. Under suitable conditions, I establish equivalences between these relaxations and classic axioms for decision-making under uncertainty, including Independence, C-Independence, and Ambiguity Aversion. I further show that a weakening of Commutativity characterizes an aggregation rule emerging from a strategic interaction between “dual-selves,” Pessimism and Optimism. Chapter 3 characterizes an overprecise updating model, where an agent systematically overestimates the informativeness of their posterior beliefs. This framework captures an intrapersonal trade-off between mitigating risk and avoiding distorted posteriors. I establish a connection between laboratory evidence and the psychological mechanism driving uncertainty reduction, showing that overprecision contributes to biases such as overinference, confirmation bias, and overoptimism. When facing contradictory signals, an overprecise agent initially updates too slowly before shifting to overly rapid belief revision. Collectively, these chapters contribute to understanding how individuals process information and update beliefs from both normative and positive perspectives, offering insights into the rational foundations and behavioral deviations in belief formation.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Yang, Yuzhao"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Lipman, Barton L."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025","date_published":"2025","updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:13Z","subjects":["Economic theory"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53393","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53393","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F53393","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Lipman, Barton L."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Yang, Yuzhao"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-07-29T18:55:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-07-29T18:55:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2026-07-21T16:15:18Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economic theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53393"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["2025"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation explores the mechanisms of belief formation and updating, focusing on cognitive dissonance, overprecision, and belief aggregation. Each chapter develops a theoretical model that sheds light on behavioral patterns observed in decision-making under uncertainty. Chapter 1 introduces an intrapersonal game where a decision-maker distorts her beliefs to mitigate cognitive dissonance from past choices. Two selves make sequential decisions, with belief manipulation occurring between them. I characterize the equilibria through axioms on observable choices, enabling parameter identification from choice data. The model explains path dependence in decision-making and provides insights into behavioral phenomena such as add-on selling, poverty traps, and information avoidance. Chapter 2 examines Commutativity, a normative criterion in belief aggregation stating that the aggregation of expert posteriors should be identical to updating aggregated priors. I propose thought experiments that challenge its normative appeal and motivate its relaxations. Under suitable conditions, I establish equivalences between these relaxations and classic axioms for decision-making under uncertainty, including Independence, C-Independence, and Ambiguity Aversion. I further show that a weakening of Commutativity characterizes an aggregation rule emerging from a strategic interaction between “dual-selves,” Pessimism and Optimism. Chapter 3 characterizes an overprecise updating model, where an agent systematically overestimates the informativeness of their posterior beliefs. This framework captures an intrapersonal trade-off between mitigating risk and avoiding distorted posteriors. I establish a connection between laboratory evidence and the psychological mechanism driving uncertainty reduction, showing that overprecision contributes to biases such as overinference, confirmation bias, and overoptimism. When facing contradictory signals, an overprecise agent initially updates too slowly before shifting to overly rapid belief revision. Collectively, these chapters contribute to understanding how individuals process information and update beliefs from both normative and positive perspectives, offering insights into the rational foundations and behavioral deviations in belief formation."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays on decision theory"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Lipman, Barton L."],"dc:creator":["Yang, Yuzhao"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-07-29T18:55:53Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-07-29T18:55:53Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2025"],"dc:date.updated":["2026-07-21T16:15:18Z"],"dc:description":["2025"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation explores the mechanisms of belief formation and updating, focusing on cognitive dissonance, overprecision, and belief aggregation. Each chapter develops a theoretical model that sheds light on behavioral patterns observed in decision-making under uncertainty. Chapter 1 introduces an intrapersonal game where a decision-maker distorts her beliefs to mitigate cognitive dissonance from past choices. Two selves make sequential decisions, with belief manipulation occurring between them. I characterize the equilibria through axioms on observable choices, enabling parameter identification from choice data. The model explains path dependence in decision-making and provides insights into behavioral phenomena such as add-on selling, poverty traps, and information avoidance. Chapter 2 examines Commutativity, a normative criterion in belief aggregation stating that the aggregation of expert posteriors should be identical to updating aggregated priors. I propose thought experiments that challenge its normative appeal and motivate its relaxations. Under suitable conditions, I establish equivalences between these relaxations and classic axioms for decision-making under uncertainty, including Independence, C-Independence, and Ambiguity Aversion. I further show that a weakening of Commutativity characterizes an aggregation rule emerging from a strategic interaction between “dual-selves,” Pessimism and Optimism. Chapter 3 characterizes an overprecise updating model, where an agent systematically overestimates the informativeness of their posterior beliefs. This framework captures an intrapersonal trade-off between mitigating risk and avoiding distorted posteriors. I establish a connection between laboratory evidence and the psychological mechanism driving uncertainty reduction, showing that overprecision contributes to biases such as overinference, confirmation bias, and overoptimism. When facing contradictory signals, an overprecise agent initially updates too slowly before shifting to overly rapid belief revision. Collectively, these chapters contribute to understanding how individuals process information and update beliefs from both normative and positive perspectives, offering insights into the rational foundations and behavioral deviations in belief formation."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53393"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:subject":["Economic theory"],"dc:title":["Essays on decision theory"],"dc:type":["Thesis/Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["Boston University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:13Z"}