{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53672"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53672","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Self-love: reasons for and commitment to it","abstract":"This dissertation develops a rationalist account of love and self-love, which treats love as an attitude responsive to normative reasons. Self-love, the attitude one takes toward oneself that involves accepting, valuing, and caring for oneself, has received comparatively little attention in contemporary philosophy of love. I argue that self-love is best understood as the same type of attitude as other-love, reflexively directed and amenable to the same philosophical analysis, while offering a positive account of the nature of love in general. Chapter 1 considers the qualities view, on which the reasons for loving a person are the attractive qualities they possess. I construct an account of self-love from the qualities view’s resources and assess its tenability. The view captures the merit-based intuition that we want to be loved for what is admirable about us, but faces four well-known problems that persist or worsen in the case of self-love. I propose two solutions and argue that neither works. Chapter 2 considers the personhood view, on which the reason for loving a person is their being a person. I distinguish two versions of the view and consider personhood-based self-love according to each. The view captures the non-merit-based intuition that we want to be loved despite our flaws, but struggles with accommodating merit-based intuitions that I evince with two objections. Chapter 3 develops my positive account: the commitment-complex view. Love, on this view, is a complex of two reasons-responsive components: a pro-attitude toward the beloved that responds to features warranting it, and a commitment to sustain that pro-attitude for the right kind of reasons. I motivate the view by showing how it accounts for a wide range of ordinary experiences of love. Beyond its explanatory strength, the view offers four theoretical advantages. It accommodates the dual demand for merit-based and non-merit-based love. It preserves the structural unity of love across kinds, such as romantic love, parental love, friendship, and self-love. It dissolves the appraisal/bestowal tension by locating each function in a different component. And it extends to self-love without strain, providing diagnostic resources for attitude-internal failures that rival accounts cannot accommodate.","abstract_html":"This dissertation develops a rationalist account of love and self-love, which treats love as an attitude responsive to normative reasons. Self-love, the attitude one takes toward oneself that involves accepting, valuing, and caring for oneself, has received comparatively little attention in contemporary philosophy of love. I argue that self-love is best understood as the same type of attitude as other-love, reflexively directed and amenable to the same philosophical analysis, while offering a positive account of the nature of love in general. Chapter 1 considers the qualities view, on which the reasons for loving a person are the attractive qualities they possess. I construct an account of self-love from the qualities view’s resources and assess its tenability. The view captures the merit-based intuition that we want to be loved for what is admirable about us, but faces four well-known problems that persist or worsen in the case of self-love. I propose two solutions and argue that neither works. Chapter 2 considers the personhood view, on which the reason for loving a person is their being a person. I distinguish two versions of the view and consider personhood-based self-love according to each. The view captures the non-merit-based intuition that we want to be loved despite our flaws, but struggles with accommodating merit-based intuitions that I evince with two objections. Chapter 3 develops my positive account: the commitment-complex view. Love, on this view, is a complex of two reasons-responsive components: a pro-attitude toward the beloved that responds to features warranting it, and a commitment to sustain that pro-attitude for the right kind of reasons. I motivate the view by showing how it accounts for a wide range of ordinary experiences of love. Beyond its explanatory strength, the view offers four theoretical advantages. It accommodates the dual demand for merit-based and non-merit-based love. It preserves the structural unity of love across kinds, such as romantic love, parental love, friendship, and self-love. It dissolves the appraisal/bestowal tension by locating each function in a different component. And it extends to self-love without strain, providing diagnostic resources for attitude-internal failures that rival accounts cannot accommodate.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Baek, Seowon"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Star, Daniel"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026","date_published":"2026","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:37:35Z","subjects":["Ethics"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":["Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International"],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53672","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53672","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F53672","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Star, Daniel"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Baek, Seowon"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-10-09T15:53:59Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-10-09T15:53:59Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2026-09-29T19:18:03Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Ethics"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53672"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation develops a rationalist account of love and self-love, which treats love as an attitude responsive to normative reasons. Self-love, the attitude one takes toward oneself that involves accepting, valuing, and caring for oneself, has received comparatively little attention in contemporary philosophy of love. I argue that self-love is best understood as the same type of attitude as other-love, reflexively directed and amenable to the same philosophical analysis, while offering a positive account of the nature of love in general. Chapter 1 considers the qualities view, on which the reasons for loving a person are the attractive qualities they possess. I construct an account of self-love from the qualities view’s resources and assess its tenability. The view captures the merit-based intuition that we want to be loved for what is admirable about us, but faces four well-known problems that persist or worsen in the case of self-love. I propose two solutions and argue that neither works. Chapter 2 considers the personhood view, on which the reason for loving a person is their being a person. I distinguish two versions of the view and consider personhood-based self-love according to each. The view captures the non-merit-based intuition that we want to be loved despite our flaws, but struggles with accommodating merit-based intuitions that I evince with two objections. Chapter 3 develops my positive account: the commitment-complex view. Love, on this view, is a complex of two reasons-responsive components: a pro-attitude toward the beloved that responds to features warranting it, and a commitment to sustain that pro-attitude for the right kind of reasons. I motivate the view by showing how it accounts for a wide range of ordinary experiences of love. Beyond its explanatory strength, the view offers four theoretical advantages. It accommodates the dual demand for merit-based and non-merit-based love. It preserves the structural unity of love across kinds, such as romantic love, parental love, friendship, and self-love. It dissolves the appraisal/bestowal tension by locating each function in a different component. And it extends to self-love without strain, providing diagnostic resources for attitude-internal failures that rival accounts cannot accommodate."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Self-love: reasons for and commitment to it"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Star, Daniel"],"dc:creator":["Baek, Seowon"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-10-09T15:53:59Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-10-09T15:53:59Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2026"],"dc:date.updated":["2026-09-29T19:18:03Z"],"dc:description":["2026"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation develops a rationalist account of love and self-love, which treats love as an attitude responsive to normative reasons. Self-love, the attitude one takes toward oneself that involves accepting, valuing, and caring for oneself, has received comparatively little attention in contemporary philosophy of love. I argue that self-love is best understood as the same type of attitude as other-love, reflexively directed and amenable to the same philosophical analysis, while offering a positive account of the nature of love in general. Chapter 1 considers the qualities view, on which the reasons for loving a person are the attractive qualities they possess. I construct an account of self-love from the qualities view’s resources and assess its tenability. The view captures the merit-based intuition that we want to be loved for what is admirable about us, but faces four well-known problems that persist or worsen in the case of self-love. I propose two solutions and argue that neither works. Chapter 2 considers the personhood view, on which the reason for loving a person is their being a person. I distinguish two versions of the view and consider personhood-based self-love according to each. The view captures the non-merit-based intuition that we want to be loved despite our flaws, but struggles with accommodating merit-based intuitions that I evince with two objections. Chapter 3 develops my positive account: the commitment-complex view. Love, on this view, is a complex of two reasons-responsive components: a pro-attitude toward the beloved that responds to features warranting it, and a commitment to sustain that pro-attitude for the right kind of reasons. I motivate the view by showing how it accounts for a wide range of ordinary experiences of love. Beyond its explanatory strength, the view offers four theoretical advantages. It accommodates the dual demand for merit-based and non-merit-based love. It preserves the structural unity of love across kinds, such as romantic love, parental love, friendship, and self-love. It dissolves the appraisal/bestowal tension by locating each function in a different component. And it extends to self-love without strain, providing diagnostic resources for attitude-internal failures that rival accounts cannot accommodate."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53672"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:rights":["Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"],"dc:subject":["Ethics"],"dc:title":["Self-love: reasons for and commitment to it"],"dc:type":["Thesis/Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["Boston University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:37:35Z"}