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Chapter 2 develops a game-theoretic model of candidate choice under binding type quotas in multiple majoritarian districts and shows that nomination parity need not translate into parity among winners, among other results. Chapter 3 examines whether the 1996 freight-rail mergers affected worker safety in the deregulated U.S. rail industry and provides suggestive evidence, from event studies and differences-in-differences designs, that mergers reduced injuries per employee-hour, though unevenly across mergers and mainly through broader systemwide operational reorganization rather than simple local consolidation. Taken together, the essays show that reforms and market restructuring cannot be evaluated by their formal rules alone: their effects depend on the strategic responses they induce, and those responses shape who is selected, how resources are allocated, and how gains and losses are distributed.","abstract_html":"This dissertation examines how institutional rules and organizational restructuring shape strategic behavior and welfare in politics and industry. Chapter 1 studies Mexico’s municipal gender-parity reforms using event-study and differences-in-differences designs, and finds that the reforms immediately and persistently increased the probability that a municipality elects a woman executive. In terms of municipal budgets, general parity rules are associated with more fiscally conservative budgeting, horizontal parity rules have different effects, and the budgetary associations of female executives shift after reform. Chapter 2 develops a game-theoretic model of candidate choice under binding type quotas in multiple majoritarian districts and shows that nomination parity need not translate into parity among winners, among other results. Chapter 3 examines whether the 1996 freight-rail mergers affected worker safety in the deregulated U.S. rail industry and provides suggestive evidence, from event studies and differences-in-differences designs, that mergers reduced injuries per employee-hour, though unevenly across mergers and mainly through broader systemwide operational reorganization rather than simple local consolidation. 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Chapter 1 studies Mexico’s municipal gender-parity reforms using event-study and differences-in-differences designs, and finds that the reforms immediately and persistently increased the probability that a municipality elects a woman executive. In terms of municipal budgets, general parity rules are associated with more fiscally conservative budgeting, horizontal parity rules have different effects, and the budgetary associations of female executives shift after reform. Chapter 2 develops a game-theoretic model of candidate choice under binding type quotas in multiple majoritarian districts and shows that nomination parity need not translate into parity among winners, among other results. Chapter 3 examines whether the 1996 freight-rail mergers affected worker safety in the deregulated U.S. rail industry and provides suggestive evidence, from event studies and differences-in-differences designs, that mergers reduced injuries per employee-hour, though unevenly across mergers and mainly through broader systemwide operational reorganization rather than simple local consolidation. Taken together, the essays show that reforms and market restructuring cannot be evaluated by their formal rules alone: their effects depend on the strategic responses they induce, and those responses shape who is selected, how resources are allocated, and how gains and losses are distributed."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Three essays in political economy and industrial organization"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Kotlikoff, Laurence J."],"dc:creator":["Hassett, John"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-10-19T18:20:07Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-10-19T18:20:07Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2026"],"dc:date.updated":["2026-09-01T22:15:52Z"],"dc:description":["2026"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation examines how institutional rules and organizational restructuring shape strategic behavior and welfare in politics and industry. Chapter 1 studies Mexico’s municipal gender-parity reforms using event-study and differences-in-differences designs, and finds that the reforms immediately and persistently increased the probability that a municipality elects a woman executive. In terms of municipal budgets, general parity rules are associated with more fiscally conservative budgeting, horizontal parity rules have different effects, and the budgetary associations of female executives shift after reform. Chapter 2 develops a game-theoretic model of candidate choice under binding type quotas in multiple majoritarian districts and shows that nomination parity need not translate into parity among winners, among other results. Chapter 3 examines whether the 1996 freight-rail mergers affected worker safety in the deregulated U.S. rail industry and provides suggestive evidence, from event studies and differences-in-differences designs, that mergers reduced injuries per employee-hour, though unevenly across mergers and mainly through broader systemwide operational reorganization rather than simple local consolidation. 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