{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53769"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53769","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Embracing or escaping the passions? Two paths to happiness in early modern thought","abstract":"This dissertation examines how early modern philosophy reformulates the problem of happiness once ideals of inner self-governance confront the realities of embodiment, affective disturbance, and social constraint. It argues that the early modern discussion of happiness divides along two distinct trajectories in response to a shared question: whether genuine happiness can be secured within the vulnerable conditions of human life or must instead be grounded in goods immune to loss. The study begins with Descartes’ reflections on happiness and their transformation through his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. Descartes initially presents happiness as inward contentment grounded in the right use of the will, but Elisabeth’s objections concerning illness, grief, and the pressures of practical life reveal the difficulty of sustaining such stability under embodied conditions. In Passions of the Soul, Descartes develops a physiological account of the passions and places the virtue of generosity at the center of ethical life, yet this framework also exposes a persistent fragility: because the passions remain tied to bodily processes, tranquility remains vulnerable to disturbance. The dissertation then argues that this fragility has both psychological and political dimensions. Through an engagement with Gabrielle Suchon, it shows that the pursuit of happiness presupposes social conditions such as education, freedom from domination, and the capacity for self-direction, conditions often left implicit in early modern moral psychology. The subsequent chapters trace two responses to this doubled fragility. One trajectory, developed by Bernard Mandeville and Émilie du Châtelet, accepts the vulnerability of embodied life and seeks forms of flourishing adequate to it. Mandeville interprets happiness through the social organization of passions such as pride and emulation, while Du Châtelet develops a reflective account in which happiness arises from the disciplined cultivation of enduring pleasures and projects. A second trajectory, developed by Nicolas Malebranche and Mullā Sadrā, grounds happiness in goods that transcend mutability. Malebranche locates felicity in attachment to the immutable divine order, while Mullā Sadrā identifies happiness with the soul’s existential perfection through intellectual and spiritual ascent. By reconstructing these developments, the dissertation argues that the early modern debate on happiness is structured by a fundamental dilemma: whether happiness consists in stability achieved within vulnerability or in a form of fulfillment secured beyond it.","abstract_html":"This dissertation examines how early modern philosophy reformulates the problem of happiness once ideals of inner self-governance confront the realities of embodiment, affective disturbance, and social constraint. It argues that the early modern discussion of happiness divides along two distinct trajectories in response to a shared question: whether genuine happiness can be secured within the vulnerable conditions of human life or must instead be grounded in goods immune to loss. The study begins with Descartes’ reflections on happiness and their transformation through his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. Descartes initially presents happiness as inward contentment grounded in the right use of the will, but Elisabeth’s objections concerning illness, grief, and the pressures of practical life reveal the difficulty of sustaining such stability under embodied conditions. In Passions of the Soul, Descartes develops a physiological account of the passions and places the virtue of generosity at the center of ethical life, yet this framework also exposes a persistent fragility: because the passions remain tied to bodily processes, tranquility remains vulnerable to disturbance. The dissertation then argues that this fragility has both psychological and political dimensions. Through an engagement with Gabrielle Suchon, it shows that the pursuit of happiness presupposes social conditions such as education, freedom from domination, and the capacity for self-direction, conditions often left implicit in early modern moral psychology. The subsequent chapters trace two responses to this doubled fragility. One trajectory, developed by Bernard Mandeville and Émilie du Châtelet, accepts the vulnerability of embodied life and seeks forms of flourishing adequate to it. Mandeville interprets happiness through the social organization of passions such as pride and emulation, while Du Châtelet develops a reflective account in which happiness arises from the disciplined cultivation of enduring pleasures and projects. A second trajectory, developed by Nicolas Malebranche and Mullā Sadrā, grounds happiness in goods that transcend mutability. Malebranche locates felicity in attachment to the immutable divine order, while Mullā Sadrā identifies happiness with the soul’s existential perfection through intellectual and spiritual ascent. By reconstructing these developments, the dissertation argues that the early modern debate on happiness is structured by a fundamental dilemma: whether happiness consists in stability achieved within vulnerability or in a form of fulfillment secured beyond it.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Fotovat-Ahmadi, Jaleel"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Garrett, Aaron"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026","date_published":"2026","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:44:40Z","subjects":["Philosophy","Early modern philosophy","happiness","passions","self-governance","vulnerability"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":["Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International"],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000-0003-1173-8070"],"render_values":[{"text":"0000-0003-1173-8070","href":"https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1173-8070","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53769","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53769","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F53769","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Garrett, Aaron"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Fotovat-Ahmadi, Jaleel"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0000-0003-1173-8070"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-10-22T18:03:26Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-10-22T18:03:26Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2026-08-28T22:15:09Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","Early modern philosophy","happiness","passions","self-governance","vulnerability"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53769"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation examines how early modern philosophy reformulates the problem of happiness once ideals of inner self-governance confront the realities of embodiment, affective disturbance, and social constraint. It argues that the early modern discussion of happiness divides along two distinct trajectories in response to a shared question: whether genuine happiness can be secured within the vulnerable conditions of human life or must instead be grounded in goods immune to loss. The study begins with Descartes’ reflections on happiness and their transformation through his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. Descartes initially presents happiness as inward contentment grounded in the right use of the will, but Elisabeth’s objections concerning illness, grief, and the pressures of practical life reveal the difficulty of sustaining such stability under embodied conditions. In Passions of the Soul, Descartes develops a physiological account of the passions and places the virtue of generosity at the center of ethical life, yet this framework also exposes a persistent fragility: because the passions remain tied to bodily processes, tranquility remains vulnerable to disturbance. The dissertation then argues that this fragility has both psychological and political dimensions. Through an engagement with Gabrielle Suchon, it shows that the pursuit of happiness presupposes social conditions such as education, freedom from domination, and the capacity for self-direction, conditions often left implicit in early modern moral psychology. The subsequent chapters trace two responses to this doubled fragility. One trajectory, developed by Bernard Mandeville and Émilie du Châtelet, accepts the vulnerability of embodied life and seeks forms of flourishing adequate to it. Mandeville interprets happiness through the social organization of passions such as pride and emulation, while Du Châtelet develops a reflective account in which happiness arises from the disciplined cultivation of enduring pleasures and projects. A second trajectory, developed by Nicolas Malebranche and Mullā Sadrā, grounds happiness in goods that transcend mutability. Malebranche locates felicity in attachment to the immutable divine order, while Mullā Sadrā identifies happiness with the soul’s existential perfection through intellectual and spiritual ascent. By reconstructing these developments, the dissertation argues that the early modern debate on happiness is structured by a fundamental dilemma: whether happiness consists in stability achieved within vulnerability or in a form of fulfillment secured beyond it."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Embracing or escaping the passions? Two paths to happiness in early modern thought"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Garrett, Aaron"],"dc:creator":["Fotovat-Ahmadi, Jaleel"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-10-22T18:03:26Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-10-22T18:03:26Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2026"],"dc:date.updated":["2026-08-28T22:15:09Z"],"dc:description":["2026"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation examines how early modern philosophy reformulates the problem of happiness once ideals of inner self-governance confront the realities of embodiment, affective disturbance, and social constraint. It argues that the early modern discussion of happiness divides along two distinct trajectories in response to a shared question: whether genuine happiness can be secured within the vulnerable conditions of human life or must instead be grounded in goods immune to loss. 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Through an engagement with Gabrielle Suchon, it shows that the pursuit of happiness presupposes social conditions such as education, freedom from domination, and the capacity for self-direction, conditions often left implicit in early modern moral psychology. The subsequent chapters trace two responses to this doubled fragility. One trajectory, developed by Bernard Mandeville and Émilie du Châtelet, accepts the vulnerability of embodied life and seeks forms of flourishing adequate to it. Mandeville interprets happiness through the social organization of passions such as pride and emulation, while Du Châtelet develops a reflective account in which happiness arises from the disciplined cultivation of enduring pleasures and projects. A second trajectory, developed by Nicolas Malebranche and Mullā Sadrā, grounds happiness in goods that transcend mutability. Malebranche locates felicity in attachment to the immutable divine order, while Mullā Sadrā identifies happiness with the soul’s existential perfection through intellectual and spiritual ascent. By reconstructing these developments, the dissertation argues that the early modern debate on happiness is structured by a fundamental dilemma: whether happiness consists in stability achieved within vulnerability or in a form of fulfillment secured beyond it."],"dc:identifier.orcid":["0000-0003-1173-8070"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53769"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:rights":["Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy","Early modern philosophy","happiness","passions","self-governance","vulnerability"],"dc:title":["Embracing or escaping the passions? Two paths to happiness in early modern thought"],"dc:type":["Thesis/Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["Boston University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:44:40Z"}