{"id":{"repo_id":"bu","oai_identifier":"oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53773"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/bu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/53773","repository":{"repo_id":"bu","name":"Boston University","base_url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Three essays on fiscal policy","abstract":"This thesis comprises three essays in public finance. More specifically, the essays relate to three dimensions of fiscal policy with applications to Brazil. The first chapter studies tax competition through a tractable general equilibrium framework that highlights the key mechanisms driving states’ tax-setting behavior. The model provides a theoretical explanation for why states with deeper labor markets set higher tax rates in Nash equilibrium and predicts that tax competition intensifies as firm mobility increases. I test these predictions using a novel dataset constructed from sector-specific tax cuts implemented at the state level in Brazil and find support for the proposed model. In the second chapter, I quantify the cost of eliminating tax competition in Brazil by imposing a uniform tax rate nationwide. I develop a quantitatively robust spatial general equilibrium model that combines a canonical international trade structure with a game-theoretic framework in which states choose their tax policies while taking other states’ policies as given, to maximize an objective function. Using this model, I apply a simulated method of moments strategy combined with a calibration approach based on the gravity structure of the model to estimate key elasticities. I then use the framework to perform two main exercises. First, I estimate Nash equilibrium tax rates. Second, I use exact hat algebra to estimate the gains from eliminating tax competition. In my main specification, I find that tax competition costs Brazilian states, on aggregate, 11 percent of their tax revenues while providing no aggregate increase in consumption. In the third chapter, I study the incentives behind fiscal policy decisions, focusing on the impact of misalignments between the legislative and executive branches on government spending. To this end, I propose a close-election research design in Brazil and exploit the country’s municipal political structure, in which municipalities independently elect mayors and municipal legislators. Using this design, I compare outcomes related to bureaucratic appointments in municipalities that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a majority in the municipal legislative chamber with those that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a minority of seats. Using this design, I obtain three main findings. First, mayors governing with a minority increase bureaucratic appointments substantially (by 53.7 percent) and spending on the wages of bureaucratic appointees (by 70.7 percent). Moreover, the increase in recent appointments is accompanied by a similar increase in inexperienced bureaucratic appointments. With a more inexperienced bureaucracy, I estimate that municipalities with minority mayors experience a substantial and persistent decline in indicators of bureaucratic performance in the years following an election.","abstract_html":"This thesis comprises three essays in public finance. More specifically, the essays relate to three dimensions of fiscal policy with applications to Brazil. The first chapter studies tax competition through a tractable general equilibrium framework that highlights the key mechanisms driving states’ tax-setting behavior. The model provides a theoretical explanation for why states with deeper labor markets set higher tax rates in Nash equilibrium and predicts that tax competition intensifies as firm mobility increases. I test these predictions using a novel dataset constructed from sector-specific tax cuts implemented at the state level in Brazil and find support for the proposed model. In the second chapter, I quantify the cost of eliminating tax competition in Brazil by imposing a uniform tax rate nationwide. I develop a quantitatively robust spatial general equilibrium model that combines a canonical international trade structure with a game-theoretic framework in which states choose their tax policies while taking other states’ policies as given, to maximize an objective function. Using this model, I apply a simulated method of moments strategy combined with a calibration approach based on the gravity structure of the model to estimate key elasticities. I then use the framework to perform two main exercises. First, I estimate Nash equilibrium tax rates. Second, I use exact hat algebra to estimate the gains from eliminating tax competition. In my main specification, I find that tax competition costs Brazilian states, on aggregate, 11 percent of their tax revenues while providing no aggregate increase in consumption. In the third chapter, I study the incentives behind fiscal policy decisions, focusing on the impact of misalignments between the legislative and executive branches on government spending. To this end, I propose a close-election research design in Brazil and exploit the country’s municipal political structure, in which municipalities independently elect mayors and municipal legislators. Using this design, I compare outcomes related to bureaucratic appointments in municipalities that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a majority in the municipal legislative chamber with those that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a minority of seats. Using this design, I obtain three main findings. First, mayors governing with a minority increase bureaucratic appointments substantially (by 53.7 percent) and spending on the wages of bureaucratic appointees (by 70.7 percent). Moreover, the increase in recent appointments is accompanied by a similar increase in inexperienced bureaucratic appointments. With a more inexperienced bureaucracy, I estimate that municipalities with minority mayors experience a substantial and persistent decline in indicators of bureaucratic performance in the years following an election.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Dias Bicalho Jr., Plínio"],"institution":"Boston University","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Marx, Benjamin","Lagakos, David"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026","date_published":"2026","updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:05:25Z","subjects":["Economics","Economic theory","Divided governments","General equilibrium","Public finance","Tac competition"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0009-0007-7412-4427"],"render_values":[{"text":"0009-0007-7412-4427","href":"https://orcid.org/0009-0007-7412-4427","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53773","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53773","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://open.bu.edu/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aopen.bu.edu%3A2144%2F53773","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Marx, Benjamin","Lagakos, David"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Dias Bicalho Jr., Plínio"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.orcid","label":"ORCID","values":["0009-0007-7412-4427"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-10-22T18:24:29Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-10-22T18:24:29Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:date.updated","label":"Dc Date Updated","values":["2026-08-28T16:15:12Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis/Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Boston University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics","Economic theory","Divided governments","General equilibrium","Public finance","Tac competition"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53773"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis comprises three essays in public finance. More specifically, the essays relate to three dimensions of fiscal policy with applications to Brazil. The first chapter studies tax competition through a tractable general equilibrium framework that highlights the key mechanisms driving states’ tax-setting behavior. The model provides a theoretical explanation for why states with deeper labor markets set higher tax rates in Nash equilibrium and predicts that tax competition intensifies as firm mobility increases. I test these predictions using a novel dataset constructed from sector-specific tax cuts implemented at the state level in Brazil and find support for the proposed model. In the second chapter, I quantify the cost of eliminating tax competition in Brazil by imposing a uniform tax rate nationwide. I develop a quantitatively robust spatial general equilibrium model that combines a canonical international trade structure with a game-theoretic framework in which states choose their tax policies while taking other states’ policies as given, to maximize an objective function. Using this model, I apply a simulated method of moments strategy combined with a calibration approach based on the gravity structure of the model to estimate key elasticities. I then use the framework to perform two main exercises. First, I estimate Nash equilibrium tax rates. Second, I use exact hat algebra to estimate the gains from eliminating tax competition. In my main specification, I find that tax competition costs Brazilian states, on aggregate, 11 percent of their tax revenues while providing no aggregate increase in consumption. In the third chapter, I study the incentives behind fiscal policy decisions, focusing on the impact of misalignments between the legislative and executive branches on government spending. To this end, I propose a close-election research design in Brazil and exploit the country’s municipal political structure, in which municipalities independently elect mayors and municipal legislators. Using this design, I compare outcomes related to bureaucratic appointments in municipalities that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a majority in the municipal legislative chamber with those that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a minority of seats. Using this design, I obtain three main findings. First, mayors governing with a minority increase bureaucratic appointments substantially (by 53.7 percent) and spending on the wages of bureaucratic appointees (by 70.7 percent). Moreover, the increase in recent appointments is accompanied by a similar increase in inexperienced bureaucratic appointments. With a more inexperienced bureaucracy, I estimate that municipalities with minority mayors experience a substantial and persistent decline in indicators of bureaucratic performance in the years following an election."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Three essays on fiscal policy"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Marx, Benjamin","Lagakos, David"],"dc:creator":["Dias Bicalho Jr., Plínio"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-10-22T18:24:29Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-10-22T18:24:29Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2026"],"dc:date.updated":["2026-08-28T16:15:12Z"],"dc:description":["2026"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis comprises three essays in public finance. More specifically, the essays relate to three dimensions of fiscal policy with applications to Brazil. 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Using this model, I apply a simulated method of moments strategy combined with a calibration approach based on the gravity structure of the model to estimate key elasticities. I then use the framework to perform two main exercises. First, I estimate Nash equilibrium tax rates. Second, I use exact hat algebra to estimate the gains from eliminating tax competition. In my main specification, I find that tax competition costs Brazilian states, on aggregate, 11 percent of their tax revenues while providing no aggregate increase in consumption. In the third chapter, I study the incentives behind fiscal policy decisions, focusing on the impact of misalignments between the legislative and executive branches on government spending. To this end, I propose a close-election research design in Brazil and exploit the country’s municipal political structure, in which municipalities independently elect mayors and municipal legislators. Using this design, I compare outcomes related to bureaucratic appointments in municipalities that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a majority in the municipal legislative chamber with those that narrowly elect a mayor whose coalition holds a minority of seats. Using this design, I obtain three main findings. First, mayors governing with a minority increase bureaucratic appointments substantially (by 53.7 percent) and spending on the wages of bureaucratic appointees (by 70.7 percent). Moreover, the increase in recent appointments is accompanied by a similar increase in inexperienced bureaucratic appointments. With a more inexperienced bureaucracy, I estimate that municipalities with minority mayors experience a substantial and persistent decline in indicators of bureaucratic performance in the years following an election."],"dc:identifier.orcid":["0009-0007-7412-4427"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2144/53773"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:subject":["Economics","Economic theory","Divided governments","General equilibrium","Public finance","Tac competition"],"dc:title":["Three essays on fiscal policy"],"dc:type":["Thesis/Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["Boston University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T20:05:25Z"}