{"id":{"repo_id":"calpoly","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.calpoly.edu:theses-4484"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/calpoly/oai:digitalcommons.calpoly.edu:theses-4484","repository":{"repo_id":"calpoly","name":"Cal Poly","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"A Federation Of Sentries: Secure And Efficient Trusted Hardware Element Communication","abstract":"Previous work introduced TrustGuard, a design for a containment architecture that allows only the result of the correct execution of approved software to be outputted. A containment architecture prevents results from malicious hardware or software from being communicated externally. At the core of TrustGuard is a trusted, pluggable device that sits on the path between an untrusted processor and the outside world. This device, called the Sentry, is responsible for validating the correctness of all communication before it leaves the system. This thesis seeks to leverage the correctness guarantees that the Sentry provides to enable efficient secure communication between two systems each protected by their own Sentry. This thesis reviews the literature for methods of enabling secure communication between two computer-Sentry pairs. It categorizes the pieces of the solution into three sections: attestation, establishing a tunnel, and communicating securely. Attestation in this context provides evidence of identity. It proposes a new configurable design for a secure network architecture, which includes a new version of the Sentry with a hardware accelerator for secure symmetric encryption, ring oscillator-based physically unclonable functions, and random number generators for attestation and key generation. These design elements are then evaluated based on how they might affect the overall system in terms of resource constraints, performance impacts, and scalability.","abstract_html":"Previous work introduced TrustGuard, a design for a containment architecture that allows only the result of the correct execution of approved software to be outputted. A containment architecture prevents results from malicious hardware or software from being communicated externally. At the core of TrustGuard is a trusted, pluggable device that sits on the path between an untrusted processor and the outside world. This device, called the Sentry, is responsible for validating the correctness of all communication before it leaves the system. This thesis seeks to leverage the correctness guarantees that the Sentry provides to enable efficient secure communication between two systems each protected by their own Sentry. This thesis reviews the literature for methods of enabling secure communication between two computer-Sentry pairs. It categorizes the pieces of the solution into three sections: attestation, establishing a tunnel, and communicating securely. Attestation in this context provides evidence of identity. It proposes a new configurable design for a secure network architecture, which includes a new version of the Sentry with a hardware accelerator for secure symmetric encryption, ring oscillator-based physically unclonable functions, and random number generators for attestation and key generation. These design elements are then evaluated based on how they might affect the overall system in terms of resource constraints, performance impacts, and scalability.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ward, Blake A"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"MS in Computer Science","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":"Computer Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Stephen Robert Beard","Computer Science","College of Engineering"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":null,"date_issued":"","date_published":null,"updated_at":"2026-11-19T07:12:16Z","subjects":["TrustGuard","Hardware Security","Network Security","PUF","Computer Architecture","Computer and Systems Architecture"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/2816","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/2816","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.calpoly.edu%3Atheses-4484","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Stephen Robert Beard","Computer Science","College of Engineering"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ward, Blake A"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2024-06-11T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2024-06-01T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["MS in Computer Science"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["TrustGuard","Hardware Security","Network Security","PUF","Computer Architecture","Computer and Systems Architecture"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/2816"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Previous work introduced TrustGuard, a design for a containment architecture that allows only the result of the correct execution of approved software to be outputted. 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It proposes a new configurable design for a secure network architecture, which includes a new version of the Sentry with a hardware accelerator for secure symmetric encryption, ring oscillator-based physically unclonable functions, and random number generators for attestation and key generation. These design elements are then evaluated based on how they might affect the overall system in terms of resource constraints, performance impacts, and scalability."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["A Federation Of Sentries: Secure And Efficient Trusted Hardware Element Communication"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Stephen Robert Beard","Computer Science","College of Engineering"],"dc:creator":["Ward, Blake A"],"dc:date.available":["2024-06-11T07:00:00Z"],"dc:date.created":["2024-06-01T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Previous work introduced TrustGuard, a design for a containment architecture that allows only the result of the correct execution of approved software to be outputted. A containment architecture prevents results from malicious hardware or software from being communicated externally. At the core of TrustGuard is a trusted, pluggable device that sits on the path between an untrusted processor and the outside world. This device, called the Sentry, is responsible for validating the correctness of all communication before it leaves the system. This thesis seeks to leverage the correctness guarantees that the Sentry provides to enable efficient secure communication between two systems each protected by their own Sentry. This thesis reviews the literature for methods of enabling secure communication between two computer-Sentry pairs. It categorizes the pieces of the solution into three sections: attestation, establishing a tunnel, and communicating securely. Attestation in this context provides evidence of identity. It proposes a new configurable design for a secure network architecture, which includes a new version of the Sentry with a hardware accelerator for secure symmetric encryption, ring oscillator-based physically unclonable functions, and random number generators for attestation and key generation. These design elements are then evaluated based on how they might affect the overall system in terms of resource constraints, performance impacts, and scalability."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/2816"],"dc:subject":["TrustGuard","Hardware Security","Network Security","PUF","Computer Architecture","Computer and Systems Architecture"],"dc:title":["A Federation Of Sentries: Secure And Efficient Trusted Hardware Element Communication"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Computer Science"],"thesis:degree_name":["MS in Computer Science"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T07:12:16Z"}