{"id":{"repo_id":"calpoly","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.calpoly.edu:theses-5038"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/calpoly/oai:digitalcommons.calpoly.edu:theses-5038","repository":{"repo_id":"calpoly","name":"Cal Poly","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Reproducing and Evaluating Charger Surfing: Robustness of Smartphone Charging-Line Side-Channels","abstract":"Smartphones are frequently connected to external, untrusted charging hardware, creating opportunities for side-channel attacks that do not require malware or direct access to device data. Charger Surfing, a recently proposed charging-line power analysis side-channel attack, reported high accuracy in inferring touchscreen input from voltage measurements collected from a smartphone’s charging cable; however, the reproducibility and robustness of these results under different conditions remain unclear. This thesis presents an independent replication and evaluation of Charger Surfing, including the development of an end-to-end data collection pipeline consisting of a modified charging cable, oscilloscope-based recordings, custom Android app, automated trace processing, and convolutional neural network classification framework. Experiments were conducted across multiple users, devices, collection sessions, and interaction styles to evaluate signal observability and model generalization. Results show that charging-line measurements can contain information associated with touchscreen input, achieving up to 95.24% same-day test accuracy and 96.20% second-day accuracy on a Google Pixel 4a; however, performance often degraded significantly across collection sessions and devices, with accuracy approaching chance levels in some settings, suggesting that Charger Surfing is highly dependent on collection conditions and that robustness remains a major challenge.","abstract_html":"Smartphones are frequently connected to external, untrusted charging hardware, creating opportunities for side-channel attacks that do not require malware or direct access to device data. Charger Surfing, a recently proposed charging-line power analysis side-channel attack, reported high accuracy in inferring touchscreen input from voltage measurements collected from a smartphone’s charging cable; however, the reproducibility and robustness of these results under different conditions remain unclear. This thesis presents an independent replication and evaluation of Charger Surfing, including the development of an end-to-end data collection pipeline consisting of a modified charging cable, oscilloscope-based recordings, custom Android app, automated trace processing, and convolutional neural network classification framework. Experiments were conducted across multiple users, devices, collection sessions, and interaction styles to evaluate signal observability and model generalization. Results show that charging-line measurements can contain information associated with touchscreen input, achieving up to 95.24% same-day test accuracy and 96.20% second-day accuracy on a Google Pixel 4a; however, performance often degraded significantly across collection sessions and devices, with accuracy approaching chance levels in some settings, suggesting that Charger Surfing is highly dependent on collection conditions and that robustness remains a major challenge.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Watts, Colby M"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"MS in Computer Science","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":"Computer Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Stephen Beard","Computer Science","College of Engineering"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":null,"date_issued":"","date_published":null,"updated_at":"2026-11-19T07:12:58Z","subjects":["Side-channel attacks","smartphone security","power analysis","charging-line side channels","touchscreen input inference","machine learning","Computational Engineering","Computer and Systems Architecture","Digital Circuits","Hardware Systems","Other Computer Engineering"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/3353","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/3353","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.calpoly.edu%3Atheses-5038","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Stephen Beard","Computer Science","College of Engineering"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Watts, Colby M"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-06-12T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2026-06-01T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["MS in Computer Science"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Side-channel attacks","smartphone security","power analysis","charging-line side channels","touchscreen input inference","machine learning","Computational Engineering","Computer and Systems Architecture","Digital Circuits","Hardware Systems","Other Computer Engineering"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/3353"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Smartphones are frequently connected to external, untrusted charging hardware, creating opportunities for side-channel attacks that do not require malware or direct access to device data. Charger Surfing, a recently proposed charging-line power analysis side-channel attack, reported high accuracy in inferring touchscreen input from voltage measurements collected from a smartphone’s charging cable; however, the reproducibility and robustness of these results under different conditions remain unclear. This thesis presents an independent replication and evaluation of Charger Surfing, including the development of an end-to-end data collection pipeline consisting of a modified charging cable, oscilloscope-based recordings, custom Android app, automated trace processing, and convolutional neural network classification framework. Experiments were conducted across multiple users, devices, collection sessions, and interaction styles to evaluate signal observability and model generalization. Results show that charging-line measurements can contain information associated with touchscreen input, achieving up to 95.24% same-day test accuracy and 96.20% second-day accuracy on a Google Pixel 4a; however, performance often degraded significantly across collection sessions and devices, with accuracy approaching chance levels in some settings, suggesting that Charger Surfing is highly dependent on collection conditions and that robustness remains a major challenge."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Reproducing and Evaluating Charger Surfing: Robustness of Smartphone Charging-Line Side-Channels"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Stephen Beard","Computer Science","College of Engineering"],"dc:creator":["Watts, Colby M"],"dc:date.available":["2026-06-12T07:00:00Z"],"dc:date.created":["2026-06-01T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Smartphones are frequently connected to external, untrusted charging hardware, creating opportunities for side-channel attacks that do not require malware or direct access to device data. Charger Surfing, a recently proposed charging-line power analysis side-channel attack, reported high accuracy in inferring touchscreen input from voltage measurements collected from a smartphone’s charging cable; however, the reproducibility and robustness of these results under different conditions remain unclear. This thesis presents an independent replication and evaluation of Charger Surfing, including the development of an end-to-end data collection pipeline consisting of a modified charging cable, oscilloscope-based recordings, custom Android app, automated trace processing, and convolutional neural network classification framework. Experiments were conducted across multiple users, devices, collection sessions, and interaction styles to evaluate signal observability and model generalization. Results show that charging-line measurements can contain information associated with touchscreen input, achieving up to 95.24% same-day test accuracy and 96.20% second-day accuracy on a Google Pixel 4a; however, performance often degraded significantly across collection sessions and devices, with accuracy approaching chance levels in some settings, suggesting that Charger Surfing is highly dependent on collection conditions and that robustness remains a major challenge."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/3353"],"dc:subject":["Side-channel attacks","smartphone security","power analysis","charging-line side channels","touchscreen input inference","machine learning","Computational Engineering","Computer and Systems Architecture","Digital Circuits","Hardware Systems","Other Computer Engineering"],"dc:title":["Reproducing and Evaluating Charger Surfing: Robustness of Smartphone Charging-Line Side-Channels"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Computer Science"],"thesis:degree_name":["MS in Computer Science"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T07:12:58Z"}